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                                              ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three substantive chapters. The first substantive 
chapter investigates the premature harvesting problem in fisheries. Traditionally, 
yield-per-recruit analysis has been used to both assess and address the premature 
harvesting of fish stocks. However, the fact that fish size often affects the unit price 
suggests that this approach may be inadequate. In this chapter, I first synthesize the 
conventional yield-per-recruit analysis, and then extend this conventional approach 
by incorporating a size-price function for a revenue-per-recruit analysis. An optimal 
control approach is then used to derive a general bioeconomic solution for the optimal 
harvesting of a short-lived single cohort.  This approach prevents economically 
premature harvesting and provides an “optimal economic yield”. By comparing the 
yield- and revenue-per-recruit management strategies with the bioeconomic 
management strategy, I am able to test the economic efficiency of the conventional 
yield-per-recruit approach. This is illustrated with a numerical study. It shows that a 
bioeconomic strategy can significantly improve economic welfare compared with the 
yield-per-recruit strategy, particularly in the face of high natural mortality. 
Nevertheless, I find that harvesting on a revenue-per-recruit basis improves 
management policy and can generate a rent that is close to that from bioeconomic 
analysis, in particular when the natural mortality is relatively low.  
The second substantive chapter explores the conservation potential of a whale 
permit market under bounded economic uncertainty. Pro- and anti-whaling stakeholders 
are concerned about a recently proposed, “cap and trade” system for managing the global 
harvest of whales. Supporters argue that such an approach represents a novel solution to 
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the current gridlock in international whale management.  In addition to ethical objections, 
opponents worry that uncertainty about demand for whale-based products and the 
environmental benefits of conservation may make it difficult to predict the outcome of a 
whale share market. In this study, I use population and economic data for minke whales 
to examine the potential ecological consequences of the establishment of a whale permit 
market in Norway under bounded but significant economic uncertainty. A bioeconomic 
model is developed to evaluate the influence of economic uncertainties associated with 
pro- and anti- whaling demands on long-run steady state whale population size, harvest, 
and potential allocation. The results indicate that these economic uncertainties, in 
particular on the conservation demand side, play an important role in determining the 
steady state ecological outcome of a whale share market. A key finding is that while a 
whale share market has the potential to yield a wide range of allocations between 
conservation and whaling interests – outcomes in which conservationists effectively “buy 
out” the whaling industry seem most likely.  
The third substantive chapter examines the sea lice externality between farmed 
fisheries and wild fisheries. A central issue in the debate over the effect of fish farming 
on the wild fisheries is the nature of sea lice population dynamics and the wild juvenile 
mortality rate induced by sea lice infection. This study develops a bioeconomic model 
that integrates sea lice population dynamics, fish population dynamics, aquaculture and 
wild capture salmon fisheries in an optimal control framework. It provides a tool to 
investigate sea lice control policy from the standpoint both of private aquaculture 
producers and wild fishery managers by considering the sea lice infection externality 
between farmed and wild fisheries. Numerical results suggest that the state trajectory 
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paths may be quite different under different management regimes, but approach the same 
steady state. Although the difference in economic benefits is not significant in the 
particular case considered due to the low value of the wild fishery, I investigate the 
possibility of levying a tax on aquaculture production for correcting the sea lice 
externality generated by fish farms.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Policy-makers worldwide have been facing a common problem: how to efficiently 
manage the protection of environmental and natural resources. For policy makers, 
economics has been a powerful instrument to evaluate the design and implementation of 
policies that assure economic, ecology and sustainability. Research into environment 
management and natural resource protection from the standpoint of economics has 
generated many insights. Indeed, the close integration of various biophysical components 
and ecological processes with economic agents’ decision behavior provides a useful tool 
to address environmental and natural resource management problems. It analyses the 
pattern of resource use and assesses the tradeoff between economic, environmental and 
natural resource sustainability objectives. 
 
This dissertation consists of three substantive studies, all developing bioeconomic 
models for marine resources. In fishery science, premature harvesting-also known as 
growth overfishing, is modeled from the perspective of the yield per fish.  The 
management recommendations from these models, however, are not based on decision 
theory. I show that a bioeconomic modeling approach that combines ecology and 
economics, and that considers the feedbacks between them, can be used to improve 
management of the growth overfishing problem. The first study, therefore, aims to test 
the economic efficiency of harvesting policies resulting from the conventional framework 
and from a bioeconomic modeling approach. This study is the first to synthesize the 
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conventional fishery science approach to growth overfishing. The fishery literature 
suggests that employing an impulse harvest at a particular time or a constant harvesting 
harvest for a period can generate maximal biomass yield. In some cases, however, fish 
size affects the unit price of fish, and the premium can be substantial. To accommodate 
this, I modify the conventional framework by incorporating this size-price information. 
There are a handful of fishery studies that include size-price information. These studies, 
however, treat human harvesting behavior as an external factor to the ecological system, 
and do not consider the feedback between ecology and economics.  
 
 As an alternative, a bioeconomic model is developed, which fully considers the 
dynamic nature of the system, and addresses the feedback arising from the economic and 
biological tradeoffs. The bioeconomic literature largely focuses on recruitment overfishing-
where the adult fish population is depleted to a level that will not replenish itself- with less 
effort devoted to growth overfishing. Yet, growth overfishing remains an important issue in 
fishery management, and there are several studies investigating institutional arrangements to 
offset the incentive to discard low value fish.  
 
This study adds to the current literature by extending the framework traditionally 
used in fishery science. The resulting harvest policies, including constant harvest and 
fishery closures, are not endogenous to the modelling process. On the other hand, a 
bioeconomic modeling does provide explanations for when and how much to harvest. By 
comparing the strategies from conventional and modified framework with that from 
bioeconomic modelling, I am able to test the economic efficiency of the conventional 
approach used to address growth overfishing.  
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The yield-per-recruit, revenue-per-recruit, and bioeconomic models are then 
applied to the Texas shrimp fishery within the state water area. Historically, the open 
access nature of the Texas shrimp fishery has given rise to excessive investment in 
capacity, resulting in a “race to fish” smaller shrimp. Large shrimp can fetch a price 
premium. Large (12-20 counts per pound) brown shrimp can be sold at about 2.4 times 
the price of small (60-70 counts per pound) shrimp. Intuitively, there may be value to 
gain by delaying harvest time. My numerical results suggest that there are significant gains 
to be had by relating the timing of harvest to harvest cost. When shrimp natural mortality is 
low, I find the gain from a revenue-per-recruit framework is close to that from the 
bioeconomic approach. However, when natural mortality is high, economic welfare is 
significantly higher using a harvest strategy resulting from bioeconomic modeling approach.  
 
The second and third studies also use a bioeconomic modeling approach to deal 
with the problem of resource misuse. While the first study implicitly assumes a sole 
owner to investigate the potential of bioeconomic modeling, policy makers concerned 
about the problem of environmental management and natural resource protection have to 
consider many individual agents or groups. The privately rational behavior of individuals 
and groups when it comes to environmental management and natural resource protection 
will in many cases generate externality. The second and third studies investigate 
externalities created by the privately rational behavior of individuals (or groups). They 
therefore address an archetypal problem in environmental and resource economics, and 
follow strands developed in environmental and resource economics to correct the 
externality problem.  
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Indeed, environmental and resource economics deals for a large part with market 
failure due to externality, the public good nature of many environmental resources, and 
open access to common property resources. Two separate but related strands are provided 
for the correction of market failure. The first is due to A.C. Pigou (1920) and evolved 
ever since. In Pigou’s example, a factory owner is responsible for the increased cost of 
washing cloth in a neighboring laundry where the soot falls. Without government 
intervention, the factory owner will not consider the cost that the factory incurs on its 
neighboring laundry and will produce until the marginal benefit equals to its marginal 
cost. The divergence between private and social cost provides a rational for government 
intervention. By imposing a tax on factory production through government intervention, 
the factory owner will have to consider the cost that it inflicts on neighboring laundry and 
produce until its marginal benefit equals to its marginal cost plus the marginal social cost, 
and the externality that the factory generates will hence be corrected.  
 
The second strand is due to R. Coase (1960): if the owner of a ranch raises cattle 
that trample neighboring farmers’ crop, who should be responsible for the trampled crop? 
Coase approached this problem from the perspective of property rights and the role of 
transaction costs with respect to resource allocation. The insights that Coase’s work 
(1959, 1960) offers into the efficiency of resource use are the following: with well-
defined property rights, if transaction costs are sufficiently low, bargaining among parties 
involved will lead to an efficient outcome; [quote] the delineation of rights is an essential 
prelude to market transactions. Instead of governmental intervention, Coase suggested 
that the property right approach would allow a market to value the property right. 
5 
 
Following this line of thought, if resources, such as air (Crocker, 1966), water (Dale, 
1986) and fish swimming in the ocean, can be delineated as a form of property right to 
access and emit and allocated to individual agents, then individuals can modify their 
initial endowments in a cost-effective way through market transactions. This is the 
intuition behind what have come to be known as “cap and trade” policies for many 
resources around the world.  
 
The second study examines the long-run ecological implications of an idealized 
“cap and trade” market for whale conservation. Whale conservation is an impure public 
good, offering a range of services, including whale products, amenity, recreation, and 
scientific understanding. Despite the current moratorium policy imposed by the 
international whaling committee (IWC ) approximately 2,000 whales are harvested each 
year for “scientific purposes” (about 1,000 by Japan), for commercial use (600 by 
Norway and Iceland who openly deny the ban) and for subsistence (about 350 by 
Denmark, Russia and the United States) (Costello et al. 2012).     
 
Gerber et al. (2014a) illustrated the potential of such a market for the management of 
minke, bowhead, and gray whales. They found that a market could ensure the persistence of 
whale populations while improving whaler and conservationist welfare. Opponents argue that 
whale permit market could potentially pose a greater threat to whales than the status quo due 
to issues of free-riding, incentives for “illegal” harvest and trade, monitoring and 
enforcement challenges, and increasing costs associated with creating and managing a whale 
permit market (Smith et al., 2014). These challenges relate to the details of market design, 
and are important for a well-functioned whale permit market (Gerber et al, 2014b). Indeed, 
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without credible international governance, whale management proves to be a difficult 
issue to solve among different users with competing interests, due to the highly migratory 
or widely dispersed nature of the species.  
 
In my second study, instead of examining a global whale management problem 
and its economic welfare consequence for different groups involved, I focus on the 
possibility of a transferable minke whale permit market in Norway and evaluate the 
steady state ecological consequence of such a permit market. In particular, I consider 
uncertainty about maximal willingness to pay to harvest whales or to increase whale 
populations, and about free-riding associated with the public good nature of whale 
conservation. I present an annual series of static models, which are used to provide a 
bounded analysis of the economic uncertainties of a whale conservation market.  
 
Although whaling is pursued in several countries around the world, Norwegian 
whaling has been chosen for this study.  This has several advantages. First, the 
commercial Norwegian minke whaling takes place within its 200 nautical miles of 
exclusive economic zone in North Atlantic. Thus, this would ensure a credible regulator. 
Secondly, minke whale in North Atlantic is approaching carrying capacity. In the past 
decade, approximately 550 minke whales have been taken annually by Norway for 
commercial use, and the catch quota is set according to a procedure developed by the 
IWC. The combination of substantial current harvests and high abundance of minke 
whale stock makes it an attractive, relatively low-risk candidate for developing a whale 
permit market. Note here that a permit is delineated equivalent to one whale and is 
different from whale share. In addition, there is a quite well-developed institution in 
7 
 
Norway to manage whaling. This includes whale product DNA testing and registry, and 
the capacity to impose penalties for illegal whaling.  
 
Specifically, this study aims to investigate the effect of a whale permit market on 
steady state minke whale population and harvest levels. A Monte Carlo simulation 
technique is used to construct the demand for what conservation because the demand for 
different whale services is poorly known. The study contributes to the literature by 
providing insights into the economic conditions in which the introduction of a “cap and 
trade” program would result in harvesting all permits (full exploitation), conserving all 
permits (pure conservation) or a coexistence between whaling and conservation. The results 
indicate that economic uncertainties, in particular on the conservation demand side, play an 
important role in determining the steady state ecological outcome of a whale share market. A 
key finding is that while a whale shares market has the potential to yield a wide range of 
possible outcomes —from full exploitation to pure conservation— pure conservation is the 
most likely outcome. 
 
The third study examines a negative externality problem that is similar with 
Pigou’s factory and laundry example. Salmon farms located near the migratory route of 
wild salmon are a potential reservoir for sea lice reproduction. Originally farms are free 
of lice. When the adult wild stocks migrate back to the parent river for spawning, they 
carry adult gravid lice. These adult gravid lice reproduce and spread into the farms close-
by. They then infest wild juvenile salmon emerging from the parent river. The sea lice 
transmission from fishing farms to wild fisheries represents a negative externality during 
the fish farming production process, the value of which is the cost incurred by the wild 
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fishery. For fish farmers, this is an external cost that is not considered in their decision 
process without the relevant policy being in place.  
 
The presence of salmon farming of high density and the high density of fish in 
farms around the coast may change the dynamics of sea lice and wild stocks. While the 
sea lice ecology is relatively well-known, to the author’s knowledge, there are only two 
economic analyses of sea lice impact. Liu, Sumaila and Volpe (2011) explore the economic 
impact under fixed exploitation policy and target escapement policy by exogenously and 
randomly set sea lice induced mortality rates. Abolofia et al. (2014) used data from the 
Norwegian salmon industry to investigate the biological and economic impact of sea lice on 
salmon farms. Neither of these two articles incorporates sea lice dynamics within the 
economic model. 
 
This study adds to the literature by investigating the externality between fish farms 
and the wild fishery. As far as I am aware, this is the first study to provide a dynamic 
bioeconomic assessment of the interaction between salmon farms and wild fishery by 
integrating a discrete macro-parasite and host interaction model with an economic model. 
It investigates the optimal control policy from the perspective of salmon aquaculture, and 
then from the perspective of a joint fisheries manager. By taking account the complex 
relationship between sea lice population, farmed fishery and the wild fishery, I am able to 
evaluate how much privately optimal treatment behavior deviates from the socially optimal 
solution, and to assess the economic impact of salmon aquaculture on the wild fishery due to 
sea lice transmission. In this study I also investigate possible institutional arrangements for 
sea lice control.  
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I conclude the dissertation with a summary of each study. This identifies the 
contributions of each chapter, and discusses their policy implications. It also provides 
directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
CONVENTIONAL AND BIOECONOMIC APPROACHES TO ADDRESS 
PREMATURE HARVESTING 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is currently widespread scientific concern that many marine capture 
fisheries have been overfished (Costello et al., 2012; Pikitch, 2012; Neubauer et al., 
2013). Indeed, most marine fishery management is generally concerned with preventing 
overfishing, where overfishing is defined relative to an acceptable level, biologically or 
economically. In managed fisheries this might be quota set by the management authority. 
In unmanaged fisheries it might be the harvest level associated with an efficiency 
criterion. Overfishing takes two forms. It can occur through recruitment overfishing or 
harvesting too much of the stock so that potential recruitment is compromised, and 
premature harvesting, also known as growth overfishing, which reduces potential yield 
per fish (Haddon, 2001).  
The ecological and economic fishery literatures largely focus on recruitment 
overfishing, with less effort devoted to growth overfishing. Yet growth overfishing is 
often an important ecological and economic issue in fishery management. Several recent 
articles argue that growth overfishing truncates the age structure of fish stocks and can 
lead to both stock fluctuations (Hsieh et al. 2006; Anderson et al. 2008) and evolutionary 
effects (Guttormsen et al. 2008). Economically, growth overfishing can reduce the 
profitability of fisheries, both within-season as fish are harvested at a size that fails to 
maximize their value, and across seasons through its recruitment and evolutionary 
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feedbacks. Traditionally, growth overfishing is addressed with yield-per-recruit analysis 
in fishery management. One policy response to this biological threat, derived from the 
recruit analysis, has been to impose gear restrictions (Quinn and Deriso, 1999). Gear 
restrictions, however, do not address the economic drivers of growth overfishing.  
The problem of growth overfishing has multiple contributing dimensions, 
including gear restrictions, multiple cohorts (and/or species) of different age structure, 
and hold size restrictions that induce highgrading. This study abstracts from many of 
these complexities to focus on a single (homogeneous) annual cohort fishery. While most 
fisheries are thought of as a renewable resource, many shrimp (Ward and Sutinen 1994; 
Huang and Smith 2011) and cephalopod fisheries (Grant et al. 1981) do not show a 
significant relationship between the breeding stock and juvenile recruitment into the 
fishery (Grant et al. 1981; Wilen 1985; Swallow 1994), thereby justifying the applied 
value of the focus on a single cohort.  
Fish size often affects the unit price of fish (Bjorndal 1988; Arnason 1992; 
Mistiaen and Strand 1999). The premia can be substantial, and tend to vary by species. In 
the U.S., for example, large (12-20 counts per pound) brown shrimp can be sold at about 
2.4 times the unit price of small (60-70 counts per pound) shrimp. For Atlantic cod, the 
unit price of large (> 15 lb) fish is approximately 1.4 times that of small fish (2-4 lb) 
(derived from Smith et al. 2011). It is therefore important to consider the effect of size-
based pricing on fishery management (Hilborn and Walters, 1992; Ye 1998), and its 
impact on yield-per-recruit and the paralleled revenue-per-recruit (Gallagher et al. 2004).  
These recruit models also treat human harvesting behavior as an external factor to the 
ecological system, and do not consider the stock-dependent cost of harvest.  
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As an alternative, bioeconomic analyses treat fishery harvest strategies as 
endogenous to the jointly determined human-ecological system, and have been widely 
used both to model the joint systems and inform management strategies (Conrad and 
Clark, 1976). Several bioeconomic studies incorporate size-price information into their 
analyses in the context of multi-cohorts (e.g., Zimmermann et al, 2011; Kristofersson and 
Rickertsen, 2008; Diekert, 2012), and have investigated options for removing the 
incentive for selective harvesting (Diekert, 2012; Smith and Gopalakrishnan, 2011). 
The annual cohort is regarded as an economic asset, capable of generating profits through 
harvesting. There is a sense in which the single annual cohort resembles a single even-
aged forest stand.  The fisher’s problem, like the forester’s problem, is to determine the 
optimal time to harvest the stock1.  
By focusing on a single cohort fishery I compare the harvest strategies resulting 
from the yield-per-recruit and revenue-per-recruits frameworks traditionally used in 
fishery sciences with the harvest strategies obtained from a capital theoretic framework 
that solves the problem of when to harvest a physically growing fish stock when a size-
price function is included. By comparing these strategies I am able to show how the 
socially optimal harvest (and hence the optimal intervention) depends on the modeling 
approach. I illustrate the full range of approaches through a numerical study of the Gulf 
of Mexico shrimp fishery.  
 
                                                 
1
 The solution to the forester’s problem was first found by Martin Faustmann in 1849, 
who calculated the optimal rotation for a forest stand. Later, Irving Fisher (1907) 
proposed a solution for a single rotation model in which the stand is harvested when the 
growth in its value is equal to interest rate. Each of these results can be seen as special 
cases of the foundational principles stated in their modern form by Harold Hotelling in 
1931. 
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2.2 Modeling Approaches 
2.2.1 Yield-per-Recruit Analysis and Extensions 
Conventional yield per recruit (YPR) analysis focuses on the potential yield from 
a fish cohort, and specifies the effect of selection patterns and fish harvesting strategies 
on yield. It provides a biological reference point for fishery management policy (Pereiro 
1992). I first examine the basic structure of yield-per-recruit, which I refer to as the 
“conventional” approach to growth overfishing. For a short-lived species, which does not 
show a significant relationship between spawning stock level and recruitment, maximum 
yield-per-recruit is analogous to MSY. When fishing effort is not bounded above, the 
maximum yield-per-recruit is achieved by applying an impulse or “knife edge” harvest at 
the age maxyt when the cohort biomass per recruit is maximized (Getz and Haight 1989; 
Quinn and Deriso 1999).  
Consider an initial fish population stock level 0x , which is also referred to as 
recruitment for a short-lived species, like shrimp, having a known von Bertallanffy 
growth function, ( ) ( )01 k t tw t w e
β
− −
∞
 = −  , where ,0,0,0 0 ≥>>∞ tkw and β  lies 
between 2.5 and 3. A value close to 3 implies that individual fish grow according to the 
exponential function ( )( )01 k t te β− −−  in three dimensions (width, length, height), ensuring 
that the von Bertalanffy function satisfies 
1( ) 0d ww
dt
−
<
&
 for 0≥t , which implies the 
proportional rate of weight growth decrease with age (Getz and Haight 1989). 
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I assume that natural fish mortality is m. When there is no harvesting, the change 
of stock is therefore, x mx= −&  . In the case of no upper bound for fishing mortality, the 
objective is to choose a harvesting time t to maximize yield-per-recruit.  Mathematically, 
   
max ( ) * ( )
t
w t x t
  
The first order condition with respect to t requires  &w = wm . By substituting the von 
Bertallanffy growth function described above, time maxyt is found to be 
ty
max = t0 +
1
k
ln 1+ βk
m




 
When fish are small, their per-capita growth is sufficient to offset the loss of 
biomass from natural mortality. Therefore, fisheries managers aiming to maximize YPR 
would prohibit harvest during this period. As biomass increases, the marginal biomass  
( &w) gain associated with individual growth approaches the marginal biomass loss ( wm ) 
due to natural mortality. With unbounded fishing effort, fisheries managers would wait 
until the single cohort biomass peaks at age maxyt , at which time &w = wm , and then harvest 
the entire cohort at this exact moment using an impulse harvest (Fig. 2.1). If the manager 
waits any longer, the marginal biomass loss from mortality associate with that delay 
exceeds the marginal biomass gain from individual growth. Alternatively if the harvest 
time is accelerated, then the foregone biomass gain exceeds the gains from reduced 
mortality.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Yield-per-Recruit 
Note: Impulse harvesting applies 
revenue-per-recruit case in order to achieve maximum revenue
 
 Next consider the incorporation of an increasing 
traditional yield-per-recruit analysis. Define the revenue function 
as ( ) ( )( ) ( )t p w t w tψ = , where
weight function )(tw . The function
when their weight is very small, 
( )( )p w t  goes through the origin
                                                
2
 It might be more realistic that a minimum weight is required in order to achieve market 
value, which suggests that there is a negative intercept term for 
This does not change the qualitative result, but the mathematical expression for 
be messy. For the sake of tractability, the 
the origin.  
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versus Revenue-per-Recruit 
 
in both cases, but the harvest time is delayed 
. 
size-price function into this 
for a single fish 
( )( )p w t is the unit price for fish with an individual
( )( )p w t is monotonically increasing. I assume that 
individual fish have no economic value so this function
2
, and takes the form ( )( ) ( )p w w bw t= , b
 
this ( )(p w t
( )( )p w t function is rescaled to pass through 
in the 
at age t
 
.0>
)
 
function. 
max
Rt will 
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Incorporating revenue considerations into the traditional yield-per-recruit model structure 
when there is no upper bound for fishing mortality, results in a model where the fishery 
manager’s task is to choose a harvesting time t to maximize revenue-per-recruit3. 
( ) ( )max ( ) *
t
R t t x tψ=
                                                                                           (2.1) 
Taking the derivative with respect to t, setting it equal to zero and substituting &x = −mx , 
yields 
( ) ( )t m tψ ψ=&                                                                                                         (2.2)   
Time m axRt can be solved
4
 by substituting the von Bertallanffy growth function described 
previously into Eq (2.2),  max 0
1 2ln 1R
k
t t
k m
β = + + 
 
 
At this particular time m axRt  the marginal revenue gains due to the biomass and unit price 
growth is equal to the marginal revenue loss due to natural mortality. At this particular 
point that an impulse harvesting strategy is applied in order to maximize revenues.  
                                                 
3If the revenue-per-recruit analysis acknowledges that delaying harvest bears an 
opportunity cost, embodied by the discount rate , the problem here is essentially 
identical to an optimal single rotation model (with costless harvest) in forestry 
economics, ( ) ( )max ( ) *t
t
R t e t x tδψ−= . First order condition suggests
( ) ( )( )t m tψ δ ψ= +& . This is very similar to Fisher’s solution in that it is optimal to 
harvest the entire cohort when the value of growth rate, ( )( )
t
t
ψ
ψ
&
, is equal to the mortality-
adjusted discount rate, m δ+ , where mortality is equivalent conceptually to the 
depreciation rate of the natural asset. This also suggests that discount rate has the same 
effect on harvest as mortality.  The adjusted optimal harvest time is then, 
max
0
1 2ln 1R
k
t t
k m
β
δ
 = + + + 
. The greater the discount rate, the sooner the impulse harvest. 
As long as it is economically viable, an infinite discount rate will lead to a harvest 
decision at time 0t  .  
 
4
 Analytical solution for the “optimal” stopping time might not be available for some 
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Equation ( ) ( )t m tψ ψ=&  indicates the “optimum” harvesting strategy is to wait 
until all fish grow to age maxRt , and then to apply an impulse harvest (Fig. 2.1) at maxRt . 
The reason is that after maxRt  the opportunity cost of delaying harvest due to mortality is 
greater than the appreciation rate in the value of the fish stock resulting from fish growth 
and the resulting increase in unit price. Note that this “optimum” harvesting strategy may 
not apply to an age-structured fishery.  It also abstracts from some of the most important 
determinants of any harvesting strategy, such as fleet capacity and cost. Even though the 
coefficient b of size-price function does not enter the solution for “optimal” stopping time 
due to the linear assumption between weight and price, it does suggests that a size-price 
function will impact the “optimal” stopping time.  
Without considering harvesting cost or fleet capacity, when the size-price 
relationship is incorporated into conventional yield per recruit analysis, the optimal 
harvesting time for an impulse harvest5 is delayed from maxyt to maxRt .  The delay is due to 
the fact that at maxyt  the growth in the value of the stock still exceeds the opportunity cost 
of waiting because of the price premium on large-size fish. When the discount rate is 
neglected, the time lag, 
1 ln(1 )k
k m k
β
β
+
+
 
may be significant, depending on the 
parameters of the Bertalanffy function and the natural mortality rate. In essence, while 
                                                 
5
 In reality, maximum yield-per-recruit according to the YPR-model always involves 
exploring the combination of a probable range of two decision variables, a time-invariant 
harvesting mortality and the age of first capture (Getz and Haight 1989; Quinn and 
Deriso 1999, Jennings et al., 2001).  The appendix (A) provides general equations for 
yield and revenue-per-recruit analysis for constant fishing mortality, which involves 
exploring fishing mortalities and fishing season opening and closing dates in order to 
maximize yield and revenue conditional on operating at maximum capacity when the 
season is open. 
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the relationship between biomass gain and biomass loss at a particular moment depends 
only on the biological growth function, the relationship between biomass-revenue gain 
and biomass-revenue loss depends both on the biological growth function and the size-
price function.  
Compared to conventional yield per recruit analysis, the paralleled revenue-per- 
recruit analysis combines a traditional biological based fishery management metric with a 
metric that jointly accounts for biological and some economic concerns. However, it fails 
to fully capture economic reality in at least three respects.  First, the stock-dependent 
costs of harvest are not considered in revenue per recruit analysis.  Second, revenue-per- 
recruit analysis fails to consider the opportunity cost of delaying harvest (i.e. 
discounting).  Third, it does not allow for the fact that effort is bounded, requiring the 
solution of an optimal “window” for harvest rather than an impulse harvest. A capital 
theoretic (bioeconomic) approach addresses each of these shortcomings by considering 
the dynamic nature of the system, and addressing the feedbacks arising from the tradeoffs 
made between economic and biological variables. By comparing harvest strategies under 
yield per recruit, revenue-per-recruit and bioeconomic approaches, I am able to test the 
economic efficiency of the measures conventionally used to address growth overfishing.  
 
2.2.2  A Capital-Theoretic Framework with an Increasing Size-Price Function 
The social planner’s problem in the single, short-lived cohort case is to maximize 
the net present value of the fishery by choosing fishing effort ( )tE and a terminal period 
T within a single planning season.. The state variable of concern is the biomass of shrimp
( ) ( ) ( )B t x t w t= . With a known catchability coefficient q, fishing mortality is given by
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f t( ) = qE t( )where 
 
0 ≤ E t( ) ≤ Emax . Assuming a Schaefer harvest function
 
y = qE t( )B t( ) , cost per unit fishing effort of c, biomass of 
 
x t( ) , and a discount rate of 
δ , the social planner’s objective function can be expressed as 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
max ( )
T
t
E t
t
p w t qE t B t cE t e dtδ−
=
 −  ∫                                                       (2.3) 
This maximization is conducted subject to the underlying biomass dynamics, in which 
biomass declines due to fishing effort
 
E t( )and natural mortality m,  
 
&B t( ) = B t( ) &w
w
− m− qE t( )




                                                                                         (2.4) 
The fisher’s problem can be solved using the maximum principle with inequality 
constraints on the control effort (Leonard and Long, 1992). The current value 
Hamiltonian is 
 
%H = p w t( )( )qE t( )B t( )− cE t( )+ λ t( ) &w
w
− m− qE t( )




B t( )                                        (2.5)  
And the Lagrangean is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )max ( )L t H t t E t E t E tµ η= + − +%                                                             (2.6)  
where
 
λ t( ) is a costate variable denoting the shadow price of the stock (the opportunity 
cost of harvest, the value of leaving a single fish in the water), and 
 
µ t( )  and ( )tη  are the 
values of loosening in the constraint associated with upper and lower bound of fishing 
effort, respectively. An optimal solution to the problem requires that four conditions be 
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met. The first, the maximum principle, requires the fishing effort level maximizes %H
subject to the constraint that
 
0 ≤ E t( ) ≤ Emax . In term of Lagrangean, this means  
( ) ( ) 0E EL H t tµ η= − − =%  
With Kuhn-Tucker condition
 
µ t( ) ≥ 0 , ( )( )max 0E E t− ≥ , 
 
µ t( ) Emax − E t( )  = 0 , 
( ) 0tη ≥ , ( ) ( ) 0t E tη = ; and  
                                                                             (2.7)                     
The marginal benefit of additional biomass harvest can be derived as
( )( ) ( )/p w t c qB t− . By comparing this marginal benefit with the shadow price ( )tλ , the 
fishing season can be determined.  
The second, a condition on the evolution of the shadow price of the resource, 
requires that the growth of the shadow price is equal to the rate of return on investment in 
the fish stock.
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )B
w
t t H t m qE t t p w t
w
λ δλ λ δ λ = − = + − + −  
&
&
                               (2.8) 
 Here the discount rate or social rate time preference,δ , is typically regarded as the 
opportunity cost of investment in the fish stock, and natural mortality is treated as a form 
of capital depreciation.    
  The third condition is that the state equation (Eq 2.4) must be satisfied. The 
fourth condition that needs to be met, the so-called transversality condition, defines the 
value of the fish stock at the terminal time (when fishing ceases). The terminal period of 
the problem and the terminal stock are both decision variables to the fishery manager.  
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Therefore, there are two transversality conditions (Leonard and Long, 1992) in this case. 
The first transversality condition is, ( ) 0H T = , due to the free terminal time and absence 
of a ‘scrap value’, stating that the economic benefit will be equal to zero at the terminal 
time T. The second transversality condition, required to find the optimal terminal 
biomass, is ( ) 0Tλ = . Taken together, incorporating these two transversality conditions 
into Eq (2.5) imply a singular solution ( ) at time T, 
 
λ T( ) = p w T( )( )− cqB T( ) = 0, 
or ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /p w T B T T x T c qψ= = .  
To summarize, before the harvesting season opens, the opportunity cost of fishing 
is too high and it is worthwhile letting the fish stock grow. This is the period that no 
fishing effort is applied because ( )( ) ( ) ( )/p w t c qB t tλ− < . With a growing stock, 
natural mortality will take effect and the shadow value of the stock,
 
λ t( ) , will decrease. 
When ( )( ) ( ) ( )/p w t c qB t tλ− =  and fishing capacity is unbounded, the optimal 
solution will be to apply a pulse harvest (also a singular solution) at that instant. Since a 
bounded fishing capacity prevents a pulse harvest in a single period from driving 
marginal profit to zero, the fishery manager must start harvesting earlier in order to 
satisfy the transversality condition. The manager will start harvesting at the point where 
the maximal effort from that point will exactly take all the profitable fish until the 
terminal time T, where ( )( ) ( ) ( )/ 0p w T c qB T Tλ− = = .  This suggests that the fishery 
opening date, denoted by opent , is also determined by the terminal time T and the maximal 
effort. So, the point where effort turns on is not driven by crossing the singular solution.  
Instead it comes from the upper bound on effort
"pulse" outcome.  After T the shadow value of the fish stock will be equal to zero, and no 
fishing effort will be applied. 
no harvest, then harvest at maximal effort in the fishing season until terminal 
no harvest (Figure 2.2).   
 
Figure 2.2. Three Stages in the Optimal Solution: No 
Harvest ]( ,opent T , and then No Harvest
Note: The illustrative fishery opening date
operation from opent to T will ensure that shadow price and marginal rent at 
equal to zero. The marginal rent is negative in the beginning due to no value related to the 
small shrimp but a positive value of biomass 
 
 
2.3 Exploring the Difference between the 
Approaches: a Numerical Example
In this section, I will use a numerical example, based on the Texas shrimp fishery, 
to illustrate the implications of the different approaches described in section II for fishing 
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, which prevents an optimal stopping, 
Therefore, the whole season is divided into three intervals: 
Harvest 0, opent   , Maximal Effort 
 after T.  
 
opent should satisfy that maximal effort 
T
( )B t , parameter c and q.  
Conventional and Capital Theoretic 
 
T, and then 
 are both 
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profits, harvest and fish stocks. Historically, the fishery manager has determined the 
opening/closing date, catch limit and location in order to improve the economic gain. It is 
hoped that the study can show how a capital theoretic approach can strengthen 
management options.   
This shrimp fishery lies within Texas’ territorial waters. From the shoreline 
seaward to nine nautical miles, the fishery is managed by the Texas Parks and Wildlife 
Department (TPWD).  Beyond that it is regulated by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (GMFMC) (from nine to 
200 nautical miles from the Texas coast) (TPWD 2002).  This fishery was selected 
because it has been one of the most profitable ‘single-species’ fisheries (Johnson and 
Libecap 1982), and growth overfishing is a well-documented concern in the fishery (Onal 
et al. 1991; Nance et al. 1994; Ward and Sutinen 1994; Cailouet et al. 2008). Historically, 
growth overfishing was attributed to the open-access nature of the Texas shrimp fishery 
(Condrey and Fulley, 1992). Later on, it became a regulated access fishery, with 
harvesting rights delineated between inshore and offshore shrimpers. The fishery has 
many characteristics observed in other common pool resources, such as “the race to fish”, 
and overinvestment in capacity (Johnson and Libecap 1982), such as increasing boat 
length and/or engine horsepower. Inshore shrimpers have exerted increasing effort to 
catch larger numbers of smaller shrimp, which has led to a reduction in the number of 
larger shrimp available to both inshore and offshore shrimpers (Funk et al 2003). With a 
premium unit price for larger shrimp, correcting this growth overfishing problem could 
potentially enhance the fishery’s economic value.  
24 
 
The Texas fishery exploits three shrimp species: white, pink, and brown shrimp. 
These three shrimp species have similar life histories, and live approximately one year, 
but differ in terms of the timing of their migration between the Bay and the Gulf area. I 
focus on brown shrimp, which make up nearly three-quarters of the total catch (TPWD 
2002).  
Adult brown shrimp spawn in Gulf waters, and the post-larvae are carried to 
inshore waters from February to April. The juveniles then migrate from bay areas to the 
Gulf where the same process is repeated. The shrimp fishery was traditionally open 
access, and was initially an offshore industry. In the early days, the government ensured 
that all citizens could get access to this state-owned fishery, and rejected agreements 
among shrimpers for violation of anti-trust law (Johnson and Libecap 1982). When the 
inshore shrimp fishery first arose in the 1950s, conflict occurred between inshore and 
offshore shrimpers because inshore shrimpers harvested immature shrimp before they 
could move offshore. This conflict was exacerbated by the influx of Vietnamese 
fishermen, refugees as a result of the Vietnam war, to the Texas coast (Johnson and 
Libecap 1982). Historically, management policies favored offshore shrimpers with the 
goal of increasing the total harvested value by more harvesting larger shrimp (TPWD 
2002). The Texas Shrimp Conservation Act adopted in 1959 initially defined the specific 
harvesting seasons for inshore and offshore shrimping. The act has since been amended 
and modified many times under influence of lobbyists for the inshore and offshore 
fisheries, which represent two different user groups, and by other interested parties. The 
open access nature of the Texas shrimp fishery had led to overinvestment in capacity 
(Johnson and Libecap 1982; Griffin et al. 1976). To offset this effect, the Texas 
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Legislature established an inshore shrimp license limitation plan in 1995 that included a 
moratorium on the sale of commercial shrimp harvest licenses, and the development of an 
inshore voluntary license buyback program.  
Currently, the Texas inshore (bay) shrimp spring season runs from approximately 
May 15th to July 15th with a bag limit but no size limit, and fall open season runs from 
approximately August 15th to November 30th without a bag limit, and with no size limit 
for the winter open season. Commercial bait shrimp boats are allowed to operate in major 
bay areas all year round with a bag limit but with no size limit. For the offshore fishery 
(Gulf shrimp fishery), there is a traditional closed season from May 15th to July 16th to 
protect the small emigrating brown shrimp. The open season varies for different fishing 
locations in both the Northern and Southern shrimp zones, but generally imposes no bag 
or size limits. The season dates are reported to be based on the evaluation of the 
biological and economic information to maximize the benefit to the industry, and may 
vary depending on bay trawl and bag seine catch rates (TPWD 2012).  
 
2.4 Results: Numerical Study for the Brown Shrimp Fishery in the Gulf of Mexico 
Shrimp size is measured as shrimp counts per pound. I use monthly ex-vessel 
price data in seven size categories collected by NOAA between 2006 and 2010 in 
Western Gulf (Texas port) because the greatest concentration of brown shrimp occurs in 
this area (Klima 1989). In practice, the estimated weight-price function is a step function; 
I smoothed the size-price function to make it continuous6. Using this monthly data set 
over this five-year period, I calculated the average size (lbs) for each shrimp size 
                                                 
6
 For optimal control with a size-price step function, see Mistiaen and Strand (1999). 
 
category, and used ordinary least square
function of fish size (lbs). I suppress
a slope or marginal price premium 
scatter plot.  
 
Figure.2.3. Scatter Plot for Size 
The social planner is assumed to 
length of open and closed seasons corresponding to YPR, RPR and bioeconomic 
approach subject to an upper and lower bound on fishing effort
parameter values used. Many ecological and economic parameters 
from the literature, listed in Table 1. 
shrimp as 100,000 for their numerical study in North Carolina. Here I set the initial 
number of shrimp as 10,000,000 for the numerical study. Since this is arbitrary, the 
                                                
7
 With a constant term in OLS regression, the estimated price
p=0.21+78.8w. 
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s to estimate the price per pound as a linear 
ed the constant term in the regression7, and 
of 83.4b = ( t  = 96 and 2R = 0.956) see Fig.
Price Correlation
 
maximize net present value by select
. Table 2.1 summarizes 
were obtained
Huang and Smith (2011) set the initial number of 
 
-size function is 
obtained 
2.3 for the 
ing the 
the 
 directly 
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resulting economic benefit does not reflect the true economic benefit for the Texas 
shrimp fishery.  
 
 Table 2.1 Parameters Values Required for Simulation Model
 
Fig. 2.4 shows that YPR reaches a maximum at week 20, while RPR reaches a 
maximum at week 28. The initially convex phase of the YPR and RPR (without 
discounting) curves in this diagram results from the parametersβ  and k in the von 
Bertalanffy growth function. Fig. 2.4 suggests that if an impulse harvest were 
implemented at week 20, YPR management would generate approximately $ 0.34 million 
in total revenue (assuming costless unbounded harvest) , while delaying the impulse to 
week 28, i.e., using RPR management, increases revenue by 26.5% (again assuming 
costless unbounded harvest).  
 
 
 
Parameter Value Note Parameter Sources
0.08  Allometric function (pound) Fontaine and Neal (1971)
2.94  Allometric function Fontaine and Neal (1971)
0.0104 Von Bertalanffy growth function McCoy (1968)
0 Von Bertalanffy growth function Huang and Smith (2011)
10,000,000 Initial number of shrimp
0.0035 Weekly discount rate Huang and Smith (2011)
100 Unit fishing cost 
0.001 Catchability coefficient Huang and Smith (2011)
100 Fishing effort limit Huang and Smith (2011)
0.063 Weekly instaneously natural mortality Calibrated from Nance (1989)
83.4 Slope of the size price function Estimated from NOAA data
−
w
β
k
0t
0x
δ
c
q
−
E
m
ab
Figure.2.4. The YPR and RPR, and the Corresponding Maximum Revenue W
Costless Impulse Harvest is A
 
Now consider the more realistic case where fishing effort is bounded above.  
Nance (1989) estimated monthly 
been converted into weekly instantaneous natural mortality for the purpose
However the decreasing profit 
from imported shrimp and shrimp aquaculture has 
industry. A license buyback program from 1996 to 2004 also reduced the 
licensees by 40% (Mamula 2009). If the catchability coefficient is equal to 0.001
weekly instantaneous fishing mortality 
fishing effort is approximately 100.
fishing effort ( max 100E = ) for YPR, RPR and bioeconomic management due to the same 
catchability coefficient and fishing mortality 
stock levels implied by managing to maximize YRP and RPR using parameters specified 
in Table 1 and assuming a maximum possible 
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pplied at the Peak 
 
instantaneous rate of natural mortality to be 1.  This has 
s 
returns from the shrimping industry due to the competition 
caused some shrimpers to 
number of 
f is equal to 0.1, then the upper bound 
 Here I assume that the same upper bound exits on 
f.   Fig. 5 illustrates the harvest levels and 
fishing mortality rate of 1.0=f
hen a 
of this study. 
leave the 
 and the 
on weekly 
 
at 100 
fishing trips. The figure shows 
week 15, while RPR is maximized when 
seven-week delay increases total revenue
million for the YPR to $ 0.36 million for the RPR. The corresponding stock levels for the 
YPR and the RPR both decline once 
 
Figure.2.5. Harvest Level and 
Fishing Mortality (f) is Equal to 0.1
 
The optimal harvest path and stock level for different parameter values 
a bioeconomic approach are shown in Fig. 
the optimal harvesting paths, while the right
Given the parameter values assumed, t
This is consistent with the analytical result that fishers will wait at the beginning, then
apply maximal fishing effort (
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YPR to be maximized when the fishing season opens at 
the fishing season is delayed until week 22. This 
 (still assuming costless harvest) from $ 0.31 
the harvest season is open.    
Stock Level for the YPR and RPR When Maximum 
 
2.6. The left column of the first row represents 
 column describes the optimal stock level. 
he optimal solution is divided into three phases. 
max 100E = ) until net profits fall to zero.  
 
assuming 
 
Figure.2.6. Optimal Harvest Path and Stock Level for V
the Bioeconomic Approach 
 
 
Fig. 2.6 shows the optimal paths with different cost
catchability coefficient ( q ), and the marginal price premium coefficient (b). The black 
line represents the benchmark case with 
trip.  For the benchmark scenario, before week 24, the optimal 
close the stock to fishing because shadow price of additional unit of stock is greater than 
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arious Parameter Values
s per unit effort (c), the 
b = 83.4$ / lbs , 001.0=q , 100$=c
management strategy is to 
 under 
 
/fishing 
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the marginal gain from the harvest. The fishery is opened to harvest starting in week 24 
with the maximal fishing effort until week 36. The fishery is then closed from week 36 
forward, since in week 36 the marginal rent is equal to marginal harvesting cost, and the 
fishing effort switches from maximum to zero. After week 36, since marginal harvesting 
cost is greater than marginal revenue fishers have no incentive to continue fishing.  
The first row of Fig. 2.6 depicts the scenario for two levels of cost, c, with the 
gray line representing the case for higher cost per unit effort. The left panel on this row 
shows that when unit effort cost is higher, the fishing season will be shorter and begin 
later. The intuition is that with a higher unit harvesting cost, the fishery is more profitable 
if the manager waits longer and lets the stock grow. If the fishing cost is great enough, 
the fishing season will only be open for a shorter period of time, and in extreme cases 
may not open at all. When cost per unit fishing effort decreases, the fishing season will be 
earlier and longer. Although the harvest level is higher for higher cost per unit effort, the 
stock level is also greater because of the later and shorter fishing season.  
The second row of Fig. 2.6 represents the results for different values of the 
catchability coefficient, where the gray line again represents the greater catchability 
coefficient. When the price and cost per unit effort is the same, a greater catchability 
coefficient indicates a later harvest season in order to harvest larger size shrimp, which 
generate a price premium. With a greater catchability coefficient, stock is driven more 
quickly to a lower level. This is because greater catchability leads to a lower marginal 
cost of harvest )(/ tqxc , and a lower terminal stock level where marginal rent is totally 
dissipated. The shifts associated with changes in catchability are not unidirectional, and 
cause the harvest and stock paths to cross, illustrating the interaction between biological 
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and economic parameters.  Such a relationship would be further complicated if there was 
time varying catchability (Wilberg et al. 2010)  
The last row of Fig. 2.6 shows results for different prices with the gray line 
representing higher price for the same fish size. An increase in b (note that b will not 
affect the “optimal” stopping time when effort is unbounded from above), the coefficient 
of the size-price function, will lead to an earlier and longer fishing season, an opposite 
effect to that of higher cost per unit effort. The intuition is that if smaller fish have a 
higher market price, it is profitable to harvest earlier. A combination of the same cost per 
unit effort and higher price ultimately leads to a higher harvest level, and decreasing 
stock levels, as shown in the right panel in the last row.  
Fig. 2.7 demonstrates the impact of different fishery management strategies on net 
present value. It shows if the objective of the fishery management program is to 
maximize the YPR giving a capacity constraint of max 100E = , then the fishery will be 
open from week 15. A manager that sets the fishing season according to this strategy 
should find that no rational fishermen fish after week 29 when the harvesting cost is too 
high and offsets all the profit generated. Therefore, if fishing firms are profit-maximizing 
they will then continue to harvest from week 15 until week 29, after which harvest costs 
will exceed the value of harvest. Here the social welfare is calculated as weekly harvest 
yield multiplies its corresponding price, then less its weekly harvest cost before 
discounting to the present value. In the same manner, if the objective of the fishery 
management program is to maximize the RPR given the same capacity constraint, then 
the fishery will be open from week 22. And if fishing firms are profit-maximizing they 
will then continue to harvest from week 22 until week 35, after which harvest costs will 
exceed the value of harvest.  
 
Figure.2.7. Net Present Value and Fishing S
When Harvest Capacity is E=100
 
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis of N
 
         The sensitivity of YPR, RPR and BE approaches to fishery management to natural 
variation in fish dynamics is achieved by focusing on variation in natural mortality. 
Climate change has been recognized to modify marine ecosystems (Lubchenco et al. 
1993; Harley et al.2006). For example, in the Gulf of Mexico it alters river flow, salinity, 
temperature level, and the size and severity of 
O’Connor and Whitall 2007). Huang and Smith (2011) investigate the impact of hypoxia 
on the optimal harvest path for shrimp in North Carolina, where hypoxia can create 
environmental stress and additional
analysis for baseline weekly instantaneous natural mortality (0.063), low natural 
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mortality (0.046), and high natural mortality (0.081). These values correspond to the 
estimates by Nance (1989).  
Table 2.2 summarizes the effect of variation in natural mortality on the length of 
the fishing season, harvest, and social welfare under the YPR, RPR and BE approaches 
assuming the maximum fishing effort is constrained to E=100. With fishing capacity 
bounded above, the objective for fishery managers is to maximize the YPR or RPR by 
choosing date at which the fishing season opens.  The date at which the fishery is closed 
need not be specified, since fishermen will stop fishing once it is no longer profitable to 
do so. I take the measure of welfare to be the discounted sum of net profits. The resulting 
fishing season and welfare level are also reported in Table 2.2.  
For the same natural mortality, the YPR strategy has the earliest fishing season 
opening date, and the bioeconomic strategy has the latest. The YPR strategy also has the 
greatest biomass yield but generates the lowest social welfare, while the bioeconomic 
strategy has the least biomass yield, but generates the greatest social welfare. It does so 
by allowing the harvest of larger shrimp, which command a price premium. Two striking 
results deserve more attention. First, with a low natural mortality, the RPR strategy 
generates a welfare level that is approximately 97% of that generated by the bioeconomic 
strategy. Secondly, with high natural mortality, YPR strategy generates a welfare level 
that is only 11% of that generated by the bioeconomic strategy. These results indicate that 
in the face of ecological stressors that drive natural mortality rates to high levels, the 
gains from moving to a bioeconomic harvest strategy could be significant.  
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Table 2.2. Sensitivity Analysis of Varied Natural Mortalities for the YPR Strategy, the 
RPR Strategy and the Bioeconomic Strategy 
 
Note: Social welfare for the YPR strategy and the RPR strategy is derived by maximizing 
the YPR and RPR, then deducting the corresponding harvest and discounting. Value in 
parentheses in the last column is the percentage of social welfare for YPR and RPR 
strategy compared to that from bioeconomic strategy at the same natural mortality level. 
 
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
The MSY concept was developed to address recruitment overfishing, and its 
analogue for growth overfishing is the maximum YPR. With unbounded fishing effort, 
the YPR for a short-lived single cohort occurs when the biomass yield loss from natural 
mortality is equal to biomass yield gain from per-capita weight gains. Since unlimited 
fishing effort is not feasible in practice, the maximized YPR typically generates a YPR-
optimal fishing season which is sensitive to fishing effort constraint. Furthermore, the 
YPR approach neglects the opportunity cost of harvesting. Since fishers are more 
interested in the value of yield than in biomass, it is important to account for economic 
value of yield. 
Management scenario 
Weekly instantaneous 
natural mortality
Harvest season 
(week) Social welfare (1000 $) 
YPR strategy low 18-36 256 (75)
RPR strategy low 25-42 332 (97)
Bioeconomic strategy low 27-43 341
YPR strategy baseline 15-28 86 (55)
RPR strategy baseline 23-34 146 (94)
Bioeconomic strategy baseline 24-35 155
YPR strategy high 13-24 11 (18)
RPR strategy high 20-28 54 (87)
Bioeconomic strategy high 22-30 62
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In this study I extend the traditional YPR approach by including size-dependent 
prices in an RPR analysis. Incorporating this price signal into YPR ensures fishers will 
harvest the fish stock at the time when the revenue loss from natural mortality equates 
biomass revenue gain. It is shown that the RPR analysis is similar to the management of a 
single rotation in forest economics when “harvest” effort is unbounded. The aim in both 
is to determine the optimal time to “harvest” the whole stock. The RPR is a step forward 
compared to the YPR. However neither the YPR nor the RPR approaches consider the 
stock-dependent costs of harvest, the potential cost of the harvesting due to discouting 
and the fact that fishing effort is always bounded above by fishing capacity. To address 
this I then consider a bioeconomic approach that recognizes the stock-dependent cost of 
harvest and considers the opportunity cost from harvesting due to discounting. My goal 
has been to compare and contrast the harvest strategy from the YPR, the RPR, and the 
bioeconomic approaches, in order to evaluate alternative options for addressing the 
growth overfishing of a short-lived species.  
Including a size-price function changes the optimal season length in the YPR, the 
RPR and bioeconomic strategies. The fishing season is delayed, harvest is reduced, but 
profit is increased due to the inclusion of larger fish. For a shrimp fishery, the numerical 
results suggest that there are significant gains to be had by taking a capital-theoretic 
approach to the choice of when a fishery is opened.  With the assumption that capacity is 
constrained, the fishery manager sets only the date at which the season opens under each 
strategy.  This suggests that fishermen will fish maximally until they find no profit in 
doing so. I find that the value of the fishery under a RPR approach may be close to that 
from the bioeconomic approach if natural mortality is low.  However, if natural mortality 
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is high, the value of the fishery can be significantly enhanced by adopting a bioeconomic, 
capital-theoretic strategy. 
These results are subject to a number of caveats. I have assumed that the weight-
price function is continuous. This is not really what we see in real world shrimp fisheries. 
A piecewise function would be more accurate, and would complicate the analysis and 
generate only a slightly different result.  In addition, I have investigated a single cohort, 
while fisheries normally involve different species and different age classes. Therefore, I 
view this analysis as exploratory in nature. Nonetheless, the results suggest that 
incorporating the weight-price function and harvest cost in the decision process could 
improve fisheries management and benefit fishers.  
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Chapter 3 
FORECASTING A WHALE PERMIT MARKET UNDER BOUNDED ECONOMIC 
UNCERTIANTY  
3.1 Introduction 
The treatment of whales divides both individuals and societies, the arguments on 
all sides resting as much on cultural and ethical as on economic grounds.  Indeed, 
different interest groups—notably whalers and conservationists—both appeal to moral or 
cultural imperatives to argue for the “essential” nature of either whale conservation or 
harvest. The result has been a global paralysis in any attempt to agree upon the allocation 
of whales between harvest and conservation. Recently, Costello et al. (2012) repeated 
previous calls (Kuronuma and Tisdell, 1994; Bulte et al., 1998) for a market-based 
approach to determine the number of whales harvested globally through a transferable 
whale permit program. This paper aims to evaluate the long run ecological consequence 
of such a market-based approach. It provides insight into the economic conditions in 
which the establishment of a “cap and trade” program will result in harvesting all permits 
(full exploitation), conserving all permits (pure conservation) or a coexistence between 
whaling and conservation. 
Within a whale permit market, the regulator (e.g., the International Whaling 
Commission, IWC) first sets an allowable annual biological catch limit, at or below 
which a sustainable stock level will be assured. The regulator then allocates the annual 
catch limit in the form of whale permits (shares) to different whaling and conservation 
groups. The holder of the permit has the right, but not the obligation, to harvest a whale. 
In addition to allowing whaling interest groups to transfer the right to harvest among 
themselves, such a program enables conservationists to buy and retire harvesting rights. 
The number of whales actually harvested relative to the allowable catch
determined by peoples’ willingness to p
party to reveal the strength of its preferences in the form of willingness to pay (assuming 
that they are able to pay) and to reconcile the differences in these preferences through 
exchange (Figure 3.1), a market institution thus may provide a means to resolve the 
impasse created by diverse moral and cultural 
 
Figure 3.1. A Whale Permit M
Whale Conservation 
Note:   represents an absolute constraint on the supply of whales to whalers. A 
relatively loose harvest limit (
harvesting Q*, and 
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It is worth noting that similar programs have been applied to the US SO2 and EU 
CO2 pollution markets (Stavins, 1998; Ellerman and Bucher, 2007; Carlson et al., 2000) 
and to the management of fisheries within exclusive economic zones worldwide to create 
successful common governance structures and enhance fish stocks (Christy, 1973; 
Costello et al., 2008; Grafton et al., 2006). Relative to other right-based market 
approaches, conservation interests would have access to and likely play an important role 
in a whale permit market in a similar manner to, for example, how the Nature 
Conservancy and Environmental Defense Fund acquired trawl permits in the central coast 
of California in 2003 to protect essential fish habitat (Gleason et al., 2013).   
Prior research on whale management has focused on biological uncertainty (Punt 
and Donovan, 2007; Taylor et al., 2000), while economic uncertainties, a crucial aspect 
of a proposed whale market, have been largely overlooked. Gerber et al. (2014) 
investigate the potential for such a market for a set of biological and economic 
conditions. They explored the functionality of the proposed whale permit market by 
examining minke, bowhead, and gray whales, finding that a market could ensure the 
persistence of whale populations while improving whaler and conservationist welfare. 
However, free-riding, incentives for “illegal” harvest and trade, monitoring and 
enforcement challenges, and increasing costs associated with creating and managing a 
whale permit market could reduce social welfare to suboptimal levels and, some say, 
potentially pose a greater threat to whales than the current moratorium (Smith et al., 
2014).  
Costello et al. (2012) implicitly assumed that all concerned parties would agree an 
authority (the IWC) for the global management of whaling and whale conservation. 
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However, concerns are raised that the IWC, as an international organization lacking the 
power to compel compliance from sovereign nations, would be credible in this role. Since 
the establishment of any “cap and trade” system requires an authority with the power to 
set quota, to allocate rights to quota shares, and, most importantly, to penalize non-
compliance, it requires a body with more authority than the IWC has. Since a number of 
countries8 currently ignore the existing moratorium on whaling there is no good reason to 
believe that conservation organizations would trust the IWC to police a cap and trade 
system. Indeed, for a global management of whale conservation managed by a regulator 
without a legal basis, creating appropriate institutions to efficiently deal with allocating, 
penalizing and policing issues may prove costly, politically and economically.  
Considered this situation, it might be worthwhile to investigate the feasibility of such a 
“cap and trade” program in a nation where whaling is a traditional and relatively well-
enforced practice, while at the same time maintaining the moratorium elsewhere.  
In this study, I examine the ecological and economic outcomes of a whale 
conservation market for a range of assumptions demand for different whale uses. In 
particular, I explore uncertainties associated with the whaling demand (WD) and 
conservation demand (CD).  I consider four types of uncertainty.  The first is the 
uncertainty about the functional form of these demand curves – whether they are linear or 
highly non-linear. The second uncertainty is associated with the marginal willingness to 
pay for one more whale, either hunted (whalers) or saved (conservationists) (WTP, 
loosely, is the height of a particular demand curve measured at a particular quantity), and 
                                                 
8
 Approximately 2000 whales are harvested by Japan for “scientific purpose”, 600 are 
harvested for commercial whaling by Norway and Iceland and 350 for subsistence by 
Denmark, Russia and the United States (Costello, et al, 2012). 
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with the response in marginal WTP to changes in whale stocks (i.e., slope, the 
responsiveness of marginal WTP to additional conservation or harvest). The third 
uncertainty, the so-called “choke price” for whaling demand, plays an important role in 
market dynamics. The choke price is the maximum WTP of whalers for an additional 
whale as the number of hunted whales approaches zero9.  In addition, the degree of free-
riding among conservation interests is an important feature for understanding the strength 
of conservation demand.  Free-riding is the central problem in the provision of public 
goods: it refers to a situation where individuals benefit from a resource without paying 
their share of cost for its provision, thus “free-riding” on others’ contributions 
(Samuelson, 1954).10 Uncertainty as to the extent of free-riding directly influences the 
degree to which demand for whale conservation manifests in a market, which in turn 
creates uncertainty as to the outcome of a whale market. Currently, each of the 
aforementioned uncertainties represents a serious impediment to advancing a real world 
whale market experiment. 
Altogether, these uncertainties raise at least two important questions. First, under 
what circumstances can we expect market outcomes in which either conservation or 
whaling interests dominate? Second, which reductions in uncertainty would provide the 
greatest insight into the potential ecological outcome of a whale permit market? To shed 
light on these questions, I conducted extensive sensitivity analysis on a model applied to 
                                                 
9
 There is also a choke price for the CD curve—the maximum WTP of the 
conservationists when the whale population approaches extinction—but this becomes 
irrelevant when the enforcement of conservative catch limits is in place. 
 
10
 Free-riding is indistinguishable in its effects from a lack of participation by some 
conservationists due to moral repugnance. I therefore treat them symmetrically here.  
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a regional whale permit market that considers whale population dynamics, harvest 
policies, and whaling and conservation demands.  
 
3.2 A Possible Whale Permit Market for Minke Whales 
Although whaling has been enacted in several countries around the world, in this 
study I consider a whale transferable permit market for the management of Northeast 
Atlantic minke whales (Balaenoptera bonaerensis) in Norway.  I focus on minke whales 
in Norway as a case study for several reasons.  First, Norwegian whaling takes place in 
waters under Norwegian jurisdiction only. Minke stocks in this area are approaching 
carrying capacity (Gerber et al., 2014; North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, 
NAMMC, 1998). This minke whale stock has a wide range of migratory route in the 
Northeast Atlantic, but the harvests are taken almost exclusively by Norwegian whalers 
(Amundsen et al., 1995). The Norwegian regulator would set annual quota based on the 
procedures developed by the scientific committee of the IWC. In the past decade, 
approximately 550 minke whales have been taken annually by Norway for commercial 
use. Currently, all whaling vessels in Norway have monitoring systems and are assigned 
inspectors during the hunting season to ensure compliance with whaling regulations 
(www.fisheries.no). There are a number of legal requirements on whalers and traders.  
Whalers are required to take an annual course to ensure the least pain inflicted on the 
hunted whale. The authority also uses a DNA registering system to monitor the whale 
meat market and to detect illegal, unreported whaling. The illegal hunting of whales is 
punished with a fine up to $135,000 and the violator can be imprisoned for one year. 
Finally, the successful establishment of the Norwegian financial instrument market ( i.e, 
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future contract market) for salmon through an electronic trading system (Ewald, 2012) 
suggests that the institutional capacity for a whale share market exists within Norway and 
may provide insightful information for the establishment of such a market.   
Similar with the property right-based fishery management where property rights 
are granted to fishers and can improve fisheries management (Arnason, 2012), this 
proposed whale conservation market assumes that the annual whale permits, which is 
based on stock abundance, are all allocated to whalers. Permits can be delineated 
equivalent to one whale. If the whale policy permits become a registered product on an 
electronic whale conservation market, then in theory any individual or conservation 
group with the necessary funds can purchase a permit. Once a conservation group has 
purchased a permit it is held in their electronic registry to retire to save a whale in that 
season. Importantly, as a global impure public good (Kuromuna and Tisdell, 1993), 
permit are tradable to conservationists anywhere regardless of geographic location 
through the electronic system.  Therefore, the whale permits in Norway can be traded 
globally, though the resource management being addressed is more of a regional scale.  
 
3.3 Material and Methods 
I developed a model for the Norwegian whale permit market system, which 
includes regulatory, economic and biological components. It consists of the whale 
population, the whaling quota, and the whale permit market. In my model, an annual 
whaling quota ( )maxtH is set based on whale stock abundance, and the protection level 
( )maxt tN H−  should reflect sustainable stock conservation levels. This annual whaling 
quota will be distributed to different whaling companies – thereby respecting the de facto 
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rights of whalers to whale under the weak governance of the IWC moratorium. Note that 
while the system for the initial distribution of quota may have important distributional 
implications, the equilibrium allocation of quota in a “cap and trade” system should be 
independent of its initial permit allocation in a well-functioning market, a finding that has 
been substantiated in real-world environmental markets (e.g., Fowlie and Perloff, 2013). 
Conservation groups therefore secure conservation by buying in to the whale permit 
market, and retiring seasonal whale permits. Whale permit market participants can 
modify their initial endowment according to their preferences by freely trading permits. 
Both regulated whalers and conservationists can choose between harvesting, selling all or 
some of their permits, or purchasing permits from the market.   
My model assumes that all participants only engage in trades when it is in their 
own self-interest.  This may be profit-maximization for whalers, or the optimization of a 
more complex objective for conservationists. The number of permits to hold is 
determined by the preferences and income endowments of whaling or conservation 
interests.  The intensity of these monetarily-constrained preferences is revealed through 
demand curves. I assume that market clearance of whale permit happens each year, and 
banking of unused permits for future use is not allowed. The inclusion of permit banking 
can smooth price uncertainty across seasons (Fell et al., 2012); however, it may be 
undesirable in a species conservation context since it does not guarantee a firm upper 
bound on harvest in in any season. Market trade would determine how many whales are 
actually being harvested each year, which impacts whale populations in subsequent years, 
and therefore the permits issued the following year.  
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This study focuses on the Central North Atlantic minke whales (Balaenoptera 
bonaerensis), whose populations are approaching carrying capacity (Gerber et al., 2014; 
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, NAMMC, 1998). This population level 
suggests that the initial quotas for the first year would be at their maximum. The 
trajectory to the steady state population and harvest level – assuming predictable whale 
population dynamics – will be a smooth and declining curve.  
 
3.3.1 Whale Population Dynamics 
My assumptions about whale population dynamics mimic those of Gerber et al. 
(2014), who conducted prospective analyses for potential whale permit markets for 
Bering-Chuchki-Beaufort bowhead whales, Central North Atlantic minke whales and 
Eastern North Pacific gray whales. Population dynamics are assumed to take the form 
Nt+1 = Nt +r Nt (1- Nt /K)-Qt  
Where Nt is the population stock level at time t, r is the intrinsic growth rate, K is the 
carrying capacity, Qt  is the quantity of whales actually harvested. I use the biological 
characteristics for North Atlantic minke whales from Gerber et al.(2014), where initial 
population level and carrying capacity are N0 =K=72,130 and the intrinsic growth rate is 
r=0.04. 
3.3.2 Whaling Quota Setting 
 
The maximum allowable harvest is assumed to be based on the whale stock, and 
updates each year. In the United States the maximum allowable harvest is referred to as 
the potential biological removal (PBR) and is modeled as max 0.5t t rH rN F=  , where rF    
is a recovery factor that adjusts upward – increasing the fraction of the stock of whales 
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0.5	 that can be harvested – as the stock of whales increases toward carrying capacity: 
0.1 0.4 /
r tF N K= +  (Gerber et al., 2014). The resulting quadratic harvest control rule, 
max 20.05 0.2 /t t tH rN rN K= + reflects a conservative maximal harvest (ensuring a steady 
state of at least 79% of carrying capacity given model parameters) while maintaining 
recovery from a low abundance as quickly as possible (Taylor et al., 2013, Gerber et al., 
2014).  
 
3.3.3 Estimation of the Demand Curves 
3.3.3.1 Data Description 
 
I used global population data for minke whales (iwc.int/home). The minke whales 
are hunted in Antarctica by Japan, in North Atlantic by Denmark, Iceland, Norway, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, in North Pacific by Japan and Korea. I use global minke 
harvest data. The reason is that there is trade of whale meat products among Japan, 
Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands regardless of the ban on international trade in 
minke whale products. Norway reserved the right due to the “least concern” on the red 
list of The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Norwegian fishery 
statistics (www.fisheries.no) provide data on Norwegian minke whale prices. 
Conservation information, such as the willingness to pay to increase whale population 
from one to another level, is extracted and calibrated from the literature (Loomis and 
Larson, 1994). Other parameters, such as the choke price and slope for whaling demand, 
slope for conservation demand and the degree of free-riding (the participation level of 
conservationists) are generated using Monte Carlo simulations drawn from plausible 
bounded intervals. 
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3.3.3.2 Whaling Demand Calibration 
 
Due to differences in the type and availability of data, the WD and CD curves are 
calibrated differently.  I rely upon an “input demand” function for whaling.  An “input 
demand” function is built on the observation that the willingness to pay for the harvest of 
one more whale derives from that whales’ role as an essential input to the output of ex-
vessel whale products.  This willingness to pay is equal to the ex-vessel value of a whale 
to whalers net of the variable costs of harvesting, processing and delivering the whale 
products to market11. The willingness to pay for an additional whale is its "value marginal 
product," which is the marginal variable profit, therefore allowing harvest costs to be 
accommodated implicitly. Conventionally, a firm’s demand for any input is derived by 
choosing the input level that maximizes profit, given technology, and is assumed to be 
known. Due to the lack of input cost and production data, whaling demand was derived 
using approximation theory.   
The WD curve is approximated by linear (Horan and Shortle, 1999) and quadratic 
functional forms, equivalent to first order and second order Taylor Series expansions 
around an average quantity-price pair (
, ) for the actual WD function.  
The key parameters characterizing the linear WD curve are its slope and choke price. The 
linear whaling demand curve takes the form Pt =A-B* Qt where Pt is the permit price and 
Qt is the number of whales harvested at time t, A is the whaling choke price. The choke 
price is reached when the quantity demanded of a good falls to zero. A finite choke price 
                                                 
11
 If a whaling operation is vertically integrated with the operations that supply final 
consumer products, then the demand should reflect the final market value net of costs 
along the supply chain.  If, on the other hand, whalers sell minimally processed whale 
products to downstream processors, then this value-added (and its associated costs) 
should not be reflected in the whale input demand curve.  
49 
 
is highly likely for whales as an economic input since there is little reason to think that 
the final market for whale products (i.e. the market for whale meat) should see 
skyrocketing prices as quantity supplied to market approaches zero, due to substitutability 
with other non-whale products. B is the slope of whaling demand, and it represents the 
change in price as the quantity harvested increases. The problem is to solve for parameter 
values of A and B.  Here I sample with replacement from the whale price and quantity 
data to generate an average quantity-price pair (
, ). For a linear whaling demand 
function passing through the average price and quantity pair (
, ), once the slope B is 
simulated from a bounded distribution, the choke price A can be derived as *A P B Q
− −
= + .  
The quadratic whaling demand function takes the form cQbQaP ttt ++= ** 2 . 
This requires calibrating the three parameters ),,( cba . This quadratic whaling demand 
also passes through the average price and quantity pair (
, ), which is also generated by 
sampling with replacement from the whale price and quality data. The slope evaluated at 
the average price and quantity pair and the choke price c of this quadratic whaling 
function are then simulated from bounded distributions. These three data points are 
sufficient to uniquely determine the three parameters ),,( cba  of the quadratic whaling 
demand function.   
To parameterize these two functional forms, I use data on the average price, 
quantity, and the whaling slope. Total value and quantity data over the period 1997-2007 
were obtained from the IWC website and Norwegian fishery statistics. The marginal 
variable profit (“price” for whaling demand) was calculated by deducting the estimated 
participation cost adjusted from (2) from the value data, and then converting this into a 
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value per whale. Using 11 price- quantity data points I sampled with replacement to 
create the average price and quantity pair (
, ).  
There is little information provided in the literature regarding the slope and the 
choke price of whaling demand. Horan and Shortle (1994) used data from 1979-1983 
along with the assumption that inverse demand elasticity12 was equal to -1 to derive a 
linear whaling demand, 10991.04 0.73075p Q= − .  Here I assume that the slope of 
whaling demand takes a uniform distribution (-5, -0.5).  I also assign a uniform 
distribution ($5,000, $50,000) for the choke price of whaling demand due to the lack of 
information on this value. The uniform distribution places the same weight on each value. 
These two uniform distributions are presented in Table 1. The slope and choke price of 
whaling demand in any given simulation are generated by sampling from these 
distributions.  
 
3.3.3.3 Conservation Demand Calibration 
 
Whale conservation is a public good, whose value is not measured by one but 
many individuals (Kuronuma and Tisdell, 1994).  For instance, the value lost (e.g, its 
existence value or value related to non-direct use, such as whale-watching) associated 
with harvesting a whale would be the aggregated value of all “consumers”. The public 
good nature of whale conservation also implies that the benefits of conserving a given 
whale cannot be excluded to any one person or group of persons and one individual’s 
enjoyment of the benefits of conservation are not affected by anyone else’s enjoyment.  
This implies that aggregate conservation demand is derived by summing individuals’ 
                                                 
12
 Elasticity (Ed) measures the proportional responsiveness of a quantity demanded of a 
good relative to a proportional price change. It is the slope when measured on a log scale, 
Ed=(% change in quantity)/(% change in price). 
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willingness to pay for each successive conserved whale along the demand curve – 
“vertically summing” individual conservation demands. As a non-consumptive good, 
stated preference surveys, such as contingent valuation, are generally required to recover 
non-consumptive demands (Freeman, 1993). For the CD curve, I consider both linear and 
log-linear functional forms.  The log-linear form is widely used in non-market evaluation 
studies and has the convenient property of constant elasticity, a parameter I use for 
derivation of linear and quadratic whaling demand and linear conservation demand. It is 
the slope of the demand curve when graphed on a logarithmic scale. To be different from 
the notation used for calibration of whaling demand, I use X to denote the quantity 
demanded for whale conservation. The nature of whale conservation management will 
not allow extinction to happen; therefore the properties of the demand curve in the 
vicinity of extinction are irrelevant to this analysis.  
Unlike the case of whaling, conservation data associated with any particular 
population level and its corresponding marginal WTP are not available. Typically, a 
contingent valuation survey will elicit people’s WTP for a significant discrete change in 
species population, for instance, a 50% or 100% increase.  This WTP is therefore the total 
WTP information, instead of marginal WTP for an incremental population change. Four 
statistics are used to characterize the log-linear functional form ( )ln lnt tP c d X= + : the 
total WTP for a discrete population change, the slope of CD, the potential number of 
conservationists in the market, and the participation level of conservationists – where the 
last two data points speak to the extent of the “vertical summation” of conservation 
demands that actually materialize in the permit marketplace, accounting for the extent of 
free-riding.  
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I first consider a log-linear form, ln 1 / * lnt tP c Ed X= +   or 1/ Edt tP Xµ= → , 
where Xt denotes the number of live whales (total whale population minus harvest), Pt is 
marginal willingness to pay, and in a market context it is marginal permit price. The 
elasticity is equal to, Ed defined as *dX PEd
dP X
=  . If conservation demand elasticity e is 
known, then µ is all that is left to know. Loomis and Larson (1994) serve as a starting 
point for calibration of conservation demand. In their CV survey, the representative 
California household was found to be willing to pay $25 per year, in 2012 US dollars, for 
a 50% increase in the gray whale population when the initial population level was 20,000. 
The integral of this conservation demand function corresponding to an increase from 
20,000 to 30,000 is represented mathematically by,  
     
30,000
1/
20,000
( ) * (TNCH)EdX dX WTPGWCµ =∫
                                                                  (3.1) 
Where WTPGWC refers to mean willingness to pay for gray whale conservation, and 
TNCH is the total number of California households. The left-hand-side (LHS) of Eq (3.1) 
is the integral of the aggregated inverse conservation demand for gray whale population 
increases from 20,000 to 30,000. The right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq1 is the total WTP 
which equals to the product of average household’s annual WTP for gray whale 
conservation and the number of California households. The strategy is to use values 
reported in the literature for the RHS of Eq 1 to calibrate µ on the LHS of Eq1, while 
elasticity Ed is imputed from a reasonable bounded interval using Monte Carlo 
simulation technique.  
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Richardson and Loomis (2009) demonstrate that the WTP for species protection 
varies across species, it is therefore important to adapt these calibration results to minke 
whales.  To accomplish this, I draw upon techniques from the benefit transfer literature 
(Boyle and Bergstrom, 1992). Benefit transfer is a calibration process by which a benefit 
value is transferred from data for a particular study site or species to another study site or 
species. The IWC whale population estimates indicate that minke whales are relatively 
more abundant than gray whales. Also an adult minke whale is much smaller than an 
adult gray whale. Altogether, this suggests that minke whales may be a less charismatic 
species, indicating a smaller total willingness to pay for the same magnitude of minke 
whale conservation as for humpback whales. Therefore, I consider a range of “transfer 
ratios” (1/n, n=1,2,3,4,5) between minke whales and gray whales, and will be applied on 
the right hand side of Eq (3.1) . The transfer ratio approach says that if a household is 
willing to pay $n for gray whale conservation each year, then it is willing to pay $1 for 
minke whale protection each year. The number of California households is replaced with 
the number of conservationists participating in the whale share market.  The number of 
conservation participants involves a free-riding problem related to the public good nature 
of whale conservation. Free-riding may be present in two ways: either market 
participation decreases, or market participation remains unchanged but the total WTP 
value decreases. Since WTP and the number of whale market participants are 
multiplicative in Eq (3.1), they are effectively indistinguishable, so I consider free-riding 
solely through market participation. The number of conservation market participants is 
equal to the product of the proportion of conservationists who actually participate in the 
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market, to which I refer as “the participation level of conservationists”, and the total 
number of whale conservationists (inclusive of free-riders). Eq (3.1) becomes, 
30,000
1/
20,000
( ) * ( ) * (TNWC) * (PLC)EdX dX WTPGWC MGTRµ =∫
                                       (3.2) 
Where MGTR refers to minke/gray whale transfer ratio, TNWC is the total number of 
whale conservationists, and PLC is the participation level of conservation. PLC is a ratio 
and equal to (1-the degree of free-riding). The LHS of Eq (3.2) becomes the integral of 
inverse conservation demand as the minke whale population increases from 20,000 to 
30,000. The RHS of Eq (3.2) is the total WTP which equals to the product of WTP for 
gray whale conservation, minke/gray whale conversion ratio and the number of 
conservation market participants. With values on WTP for gray whale conservation, 
minke/gray whale conversion ratio and the number of conservation market participants I 
solve for µ  in Eq (3.2).  
I also consider a linear functional form Pt =υ-τ* Xt, where υ denotes the choke 
price related to whale conservation. It is the maximum WTP when Xt equals zero. τ 
describes the decline in permit price as the quantity conserved increases. The choke price 
is not relevant for conservation demand because of the enforcement of conservative catch 
limits. Mathematically, the total WTP is 
30,000
20,000
( ) ( ) * ( ) * (TNWC) * (PLC)X dX WTPGWC MGTRν τ− =∫
                                            (3.3) 
The strategy is to use values reported in the literature for the RHS of Eq (3.3) to calibrate 
υ and τ on the LHS of Eq (3.3).  
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Even if the information regarding WTP for gray whale conservation – the 
minke/gray whale conversion ratio and the number of conservation market participants – 
is known, the above expression only provides us with one calibration equation for two 
free parameters. Therefore, I need another equation in order to derive the linear 
conservation demand function.  
The second equation comes from the definition of the elasticity of demand for 
conservation. This linear conservation demand Pt =υ-τ* Xt and the elasticity definition 
suggest 1*dX XEd
dP P τ
−
= = − , where X
−
 is the average quantity between 20,000 and 
30,000, which is 25,000, and P is the marginal willingness to pay (price), which is equal 
to Xυ τ
−
−
 . Substituting this information into the definition of elasticity gives the second 
equation 
_
1
*
XEd
X τυ τ
−
= −
−
 , where 
_
25,000X = and Ed is sampled from plausible 
bounds using Monte Carlo simulation. Little information can be gleaned from the 
literature regarding the elasticity of conservation demand. Here I choose a wide range of 
elasticities simulated from a uniform distribution (-5,-0.2). The endpoints, which span 
from highly elastic at the low end to relatively inelastic at the high end should be 
sufficient to bound the elasticity of conservation demand.  
Since Loomis and Larson (1994) did not include WTP information from 
conservation groups, the average annual WTP per household after interest rate 
adjustment, which is $25, does not include elicitation from conservation groups, whose 
annual expenditure on anti-whaling campaigns could be millions of dollars. For instance, 
a conservative estimate on annual anti-whaling expenditures by Greenpeace USA, 
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Greenpeace International, Sea Shepherd, WWF International and WWF UK is $25 
million13 (Costello et al., 2012). The households in coastal California arguably have a 
high affinity for whales (hence more potential non-use value), while members from non-
profit organizations with high expenditures for whale protection would likely pay more to 
conserve gray whales. I therefore scale up the annual WTP, and draw the value from the 
uniform distribution ($25, $75). The endpoints here do not reflect the annual expenditure 
from NGOs. However, once minke/gray whale transfer ratio is considered, these 
endpoints should be sufficient enough to bound the WTP information for minke whale 
conservation. 
Since whale permits would be traded globally, instead of using California 
household information for conservationists participating in the market, I could use 
expenditure information from non-profit organizations (NGOs) dedicated to whale 
conservation.  However, this information is impossible to retrieve from NGOs; nor is this 
information necessarily a reliable proxy for the expenditures that may be forthcoming in 
a conservation market context. Here, I assume the WTP information described 
previously, and use membership numbers from non-profit organizations, such as 
Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, and Sierra Club as a proxy for the possible 
number of conservation market participants. While some non-profit organizations provide 
membership numbers on their websites, others do not. I use a conservative estimate of the 
membership of relevant non-profit organizations, 20 million, as the maximum number of 
conservation market participation.  Due to the lack of information regarding the degree of 
free-riding, I also draw the value of this parameter from a uniform distribution (0,1). The 
                                                 
13
 This anti-whaling expenditure is used for protection for all whale species. It is 
impossible to know the exact expenditure on minke whale protection.  
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Minke/gray whale transfer ratio is drawn from uniform integer distribution (1,5). All 
these distributions are provided in table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1. Parameter Distribution 
 
Parameter       Distribution 
Slope of whaling demand Uniform (-5, -0.5) 
Choke price of whaling demand Uniform ($5,000, $50,000) 
Elasticity of conservation demand Uniform (-5, -0.2) 
The participation level of conservationists Uniform (0, 1) 
Individual’s annual WTP for gray whale conservation Uniform ($25, $75) 
Minke/gray whale transfer ratio Integer Uniform (1, 5) 
 
Note: Cases involving linear whaling demand only require simulation for the slope of 
whaling demand, and cases involving quadratic whaling demand require simulations for 
both slope and choke price of whaling demand.  
 
3.4 Simulation 
 
I considered four potential whaling and conservation demand combinations: (1) 
linear whaling demand and linear conservation demand, (2) linear whaling demand and 
log-linear conservation demand, (3) quadratic whaling demand and linear conservation 
demand, and (4) quadratic whaling demand and log-linear conservation demand. To 
examine how different parameters impact the steady state harvest under these four 
demand combinations, Matlab was used to randomly generate 1000 parameter sets from 
the distributions in Table 1, which are then used to produce 1000 pairs of whaling 
demand and conservation demand curves.  The model is then simulated to the steady state 
harvest and population levels for each replicate.  
For each harvesting season, the equilibrium harvest level is calculated based on 
the pair of whaling and conservation demand curves under consideration.  Then, the 
equilibrium harvest is incorporated into the harvest policy. If the WTP to conserve the 
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last whale is greater than the profit that the whalers will get from selling their first whale 
in the whale meat market, then the conservationists buy all whale permits leading to a 
pure conservation policy. If the equilibrium target harvest level *tQ  exceeds the 
maximum allowable harvest ( )maxtH , then whalers will harvest the maximum allowable 
harvest since they value the last harvested whale more than the first whale “saved” by 
conservationists. If *tQ is less than ( )maxtH , then whalers would harvest *tQ  (see Figure 
1). This trading process is simulated until the model converges to the steady state harvest 
and population level. This was done for the 1000 pairs of whaling demand and 
conservation demand curves.  
 
3.5 Results 
Fig 3.2 shows how the harvest level resulting from the whale permit market in a 
given season is affected by the uncertainties associated with the WD and CD curves – 
assuming “interior” equilibria where supply and demand are equal.  Recall that in this 
study, I constrain these uncertainties by the (limited) available data: the average quantity-
price pair (
, ) for WD, and the total WTP for a 50% increase in whale population for 
CD.  Figure 2a depicts the effect of slope and choke price of linear whaling demands on 
harvest level. All else constant, increasing the whaling demand slope (its absolute value) 
rotates the WD curve counter-clockwise around the average quantity-and-price pair 
(
, ). If (
, ) is on the right hand side of the equilibrium between WD and CD curves, 
increasing the slope of whaling demand will decrease the harvest level, and vice versa. 
The same holds for changing the slope of the quadratic WD curve at (
, ) with a fixed 
choke price (Figure 3.2b). Increasing the choke price of a fixed slope 
curve results in a greater harvest level (Figure 
between the two demand curves. If the WD curve is relatively low and steep, increasing 
the CD slope also increases the harvest level, and vice versa. A 
participation level of conservationists (more free
conservation will shift the CD down, resulting in less conservation effort and a higher 
harvest (Figure 3.2e). 
 
Figure 3.2. A diagrammatic Exposition o
Whale Permit Market Equilibrium
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of quadratic WD 
3.2c). Figure 3.2d shows the interplay 
decrease in the 
-riding) or in the total WTP for whale 
f How Each Factor Affects the Nature of the 
 
     
    
 
Note:  (a) illustrates the effect of 
keeping the average whaling quantity and price pair constant. Once the whaling quantity 
and price pair are fixed, the slope of linear whaling demand is correlated with choke price 
of whaling demand. (b) illustrates
harvest level while keeping choke price, the average whaling quantity and price pair 
constant. (c) illustrates the effect of choke price for quadratic whaling demand on harvest 
level while keeping slope, the average whaling quantity and price pair constant. (d) 
illustrates the effect of relative magnitude of slope for whaling demand and conservation 
demand on harvest level. (e) illustrates the effect of free
keeping whaling demand, willingness to pay, the number of conservationists and th
slope of conservation demand curve constant.  
demand.  
 
For the remainder of the 
under different settings. To examine 
estimate linear regressions of steady state harvest level on the choke price and slope of 
WD, the slope of CD, the participation level of conservationists, and the WTP for minke 
whale conservation under different whaling and conservation demand comb
Since the independent variables have different units
standardize each variable so that each has a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 before running 
the regression analysis. The resulting standardized coefficient (
independent variable X is interpreted 
will increase the dependent variable by 
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slope for linear whaling demand on harvest 
 the effect of slope for quadratic whaling demand 
-riding on the harvest whil
CD: conservation demand, WD: whaling 
analysis, I focus on the steady-state harvest level, 
the sensitivity of H* to different paramet
inations. 
 and domains of support, I 
a, for instance) of 
to mean that increasing X by one standard deviation 
a standard deviations. Table 3.2 suggests that, all 
level while 
on 
e 
e 
H*, 
ers, I 
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else being equal, increasing the participation level of conservationists, each participant’s 
annual willingness to pay (WTP) for minke whale conservation, and the slope of CD, 
decreases the steady-state harvest level. On the other hand, increasing the choke price and 
the slope of WD increases steady state harvest. Of all the parameters examined, the 
steady harvest level is most sensitive to the participation level of conservationists, 
indicating its role in the viability of a market. The results also suggest that the steady-
state harvest level is more sensitive to the parameters associated with the CD curve than 
those with the WD curve. 
 
Table 3.2. Parameter Estimation from Standardized Regression of Different Whaling and 
Conservation Demand Combinations 
 
Note: Since perfect multi-collinearity exists between the choke price and the slope of 
whaling demand in cases involving linear whaling demand, I drop the slope of linear 
whaling demand in the standardized regression, and NA denotes "non-applicable".  In the 
variable names X-X, the first letter denotes the functional form of whaling demand, and 
the second denotes the functional form of conservation demand, L denotes linear 
whaling/conservation demand, N denotes nonlinear conservation demand, Q denotes 
quadratic whaling demand. 
 
The resulting steady-state harvest levels can be broadly categorized into three 
solution/allocation types: pure conservation solutions (H* = 0), interior solutions where 
whaling and conservation coexist, and maximum harvest solutions. Figure 3.3 shows how 
the slopes of the two demand curves interplay to impact the type of solution H*. The  
Variable Name L-L L-N Q-L Q-N
Choke Price of Whaling Demand 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.18
Slope of Whaling Demand NA NA 0.01 0.09
Slope of Conservation Demand -0.41 -0.37 -0.4 -0.36
The Participation Level of Conservationists -0.55 -0.69 -0.57 -0.69
WTP for Minke Whale Conservation -0.5 -0.53 -0.56 -0.58
 Figure 3.3.  Combinations of 
to Pure Conservation (Deep B
Coexistence between Whaling and C
Note:  The unevenly scattered points 
located around low slope of conservation demand.  This is because 
conservation demand is sampled from a uniform distribution instead
slope. By sampling evenly from elasticities, a high slope of conservation will be under
sampled due to the nonlinear transformation between slope and elasticity. 
parameter values used in constructing this figure include: free
conservationists, the total conservationist number is 20,000,000, and each 
conservationist’s annual WTP for minke whale 
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Slope for Whaling Demand and Conservation D
lue Color), Maximum Harvest (Deep Red Color), and 
onservation  
should not be interpreted as that the density is more 
the elasticity of 
 of the equivalent 
Basic 
-riders are 50% of total 
conservation is $25.  
emand Lead 
 
-
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results suggest that the CD slope is a more influential factor than the WD slope: as the 
CD slope becomes steeper, the market outcomes transition from pure conservation (H* = 
0) to interior and ultimately to maximum harvest solutions. The resulting solution type 
depends on the distribution of these two demand slopes.  Importantly the “likelihood” of 
any given scenario should not be judged by the size of regions or density of points in the 
figures as there is no a priori reason to believe that the uniform densities used in the 
Monte Carlo sampling scheme are reasonable subjective prior distributions.  
Figure 3.4 shows that H* undergoes the same transition—pure conservation to 
interior to maximum harvest—as the whaling choke price and free-riding levels increase 
(i.e., lower conservationist participation). Combinations involving linear conservation 
demand generate only interior and all harvest solutions. Combinations involving log-
linear conservation demand generate all three solution types. Note that given a particular 
elasticity and price/quantity pair the conservation demand curve for a linear model lies 
below the nonlinear conservation demand curve – the result being that the willingness to 
pay in the marketplace does not fall off as rapidly at high levels of conservation as a 
linear demand with the same “local” behavior at average price/quantity values. The 
difference between combinations involving linear conservation demand and combinations 
involving nonlinear conservation demand also results from the fact that linear 
conservation demand suggests that the rate of change of the slope of the linear 
conservation demand curve (curvature) at lower levels of harvest and high levels of 
conservation is the same. In other words, marginal WTP falls fairly strongly regardless of 
stock status. A non-linear conservation model, on the other hand, suggests that marginal  
Figure 3.4. Combination of the 
of Whaling Demand Lead to 
(Deep Red Dot) and Coexistence between 
Note: Basic parameter values used in
conservationist number is 20,000,000, and each conservationist’s annual WTP for minke 
whale conservation is $25, slope for whaling demand is 
conservation demand is -2.  
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WTP declines rapidly at the lower stock level, but relatively slowly as stock rise to high 
level. WD with a higher choke price requires a higher participation level of 
conservationists in order to achieve the same harvest level. Importantly, the transition 
from pure conservation to maximum harvest is much sharper for the log-linear CD curve 
(compare Figs 4c and 4d to Figs 4a and 4b). The transition process from one solution 
type to another one also depends on the distribution of the choke price of whaling 
demand and the participation level of conservationists. 
 
3.6 Discussion 
             The regulation of whaling implies tradeoffs between the preferences of two 
distinct groups, whalers and conservationists. The appeal of a market system is that it has 
the potential to replace an adversarial system of arguing in support of one extreme 
allocation or the other with a mechanism to enable whalers and conservationists to 
peaceably act upon their convictions given the resources that each group can marshal. A 
whale permit market provides a platform for participants to “put their money where their 
mouth is” – allowing each party to reveal their values in an environment that reflects the 
scarcity of resources (i.e. that neither whale conservation nor the maintenance of whaling 
are infinitely valued by society).  A market also reallocates resources in a manner that 
acknowledges the de facto property rights of whalers under the current system while 
allowing them to be compensated for forsaking these rights through voluntary 
transactions that mutually benefit both parties. Hence a market approach avoids deciding 
if one group is intrinsically right and the other wrong, instead operating in shades of gray 
where compromise is implicitly reached. If the market outcomes resulted in complete 
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conservation – effectively a “buyout” of the whaling fleet – this would suggest that whale 
harvest is not as essential as claimed by whalers.  On the other hand, if the market 
outcome did not yield significant conservation, then this either suggests that the real 
willingness to pay of conservationists is far lower than is suggested by the claim that the 
conservation of whales is essential, or that this conviction is at least not sufficiently 
strong to overcome strong free-riding incentives.  
The utility of the Norway example is that whale conservation market can serve as 
an experimental whale conservation market to manage the disputes between pro-and anti-
whaling stakeholders in nations that still have whaling. A potential whaling buyout may 
be the result of such a regional whale conservation market, while the moratorium could 
be maintained elsewhere. This would truthfully reflect the de facto property rights as they 
currently are – conservationists implicitly have the rights to the whales that would have 
been hunted in compliant countries while whalers have the rights to those whales that 
they have historically been able to hunt for scientific whaling, noncompliance and 
subsistence purposes. This also suggests an interesting extension of the market system to 
other countries whose whaling takes place beyond its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
although considerable monitoring and enforcement challenges arise in that context (Smith 
et al., 2014).  
While it is impossible to disentangle the exact expenditure that NGOs 
(nongovernmental organizations) spend on minke whale protection, a conservative 
estimate of the total annual expenditure by NGOs on all anti-whaling activities is 
approximately $25 million (Costello et al., 2012). If the Norwegian government set up a 
transferable whale permit market it would be expected that demand for whale 
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conservation would be high. The average equilibrium price in all whaling and 
conservation combination from the simulations carried out is in the range of 
approximately $7,300 to $8,900. With whaling quotas in the steady state of 475 whales, 
this suggests that the implied annual expenditure from conservationists to whalers, if 
conservationists buy all permits, is approximately $3.47 million to $4.23 million. This is 
around 14% and 17% of the annual expenditure by NGOs, respectively.  
Despite such potential, a market-based approach to whale conservation 
management is complicated by uncertainties that must be taken into account to anticipate 
outcomes and design institutions to achieve its goals. In this study, I use (limited) data on 
minke whales to devise an experimental whale permit market in order to evaluate the 
potential of the market approach under these uncertainties. The study has demonstrated 
how different sources of economic uncertainty impact the whale permit market forecast.  
An important political and economic question related to a whale permit market 
system is what the long-run equilibrium allocation and policy might look like.  I find that 
the market approach might result in a variety of outcomes ranging from pure 
conservation to full harvest, or a balance between the two.  Which of these different 
outcomes actually results could be reflected by replacing the "ignorance priors" of the 
uniform distribution with priors on parameters that reflect a sense of knowledge about 
them – perhaps drawing upon expert elicitation methods (Martin et al., 2011).  Then the 
frequency of different outcomes in the simulations could provide information on their 
relative likelihood.  
The greater influence of the CD curve, compared to the WD curve, stems from the 
available data and the corresponding calibration procedures. Linear and quadratic WD 
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curves are both calibrated with the average quantity-price pair, (
, ). This (
, ), 
combined with a reasonable range of WD slope, results in a relatively low choke price of 
whaling, therefore generating a relatively lower and steep WD. This seems quite 
consistent with the common perception of whale meat products demand around the 
world. On the other hand, the CD curve is calibrated on information regarding total WTP 
for minke whale conservation and the number of conservationists. This leads to a much 
higher and flatter CD. These two calibrated WD and CD will produce an equilibrium 
harvest that is relatively close to the WD axis (i.e. at low levels of harvest). This is the 
reason that parameters associated with CD side can result in a significant change in 
harvest level while parameter changes in the WD side have less impact on the harvest 
level.  The above argument applies only to this particular (very) limited set of data, and 
the sensitivity of the steady-state harvest level, H*, highlights the importance of data 
collection related to both whaling and conservation.  
As discussed above, free-riding is a serious concern for the voluntary provision of 
a public good (Bergstrom et al., 1986; Cornes and Sandler, 1986). Intuitively, how many 
people participate vs. free-ride in the market directly impacts the potential outcome of the 
whale permit market, which is also confirmed by the statistical results. This outcome 
resulting from free-riding will be expected to deviate from 100% participation 
equilibrium. When conservationists have to compensate whalers to forgo some 
harvesting, there is an incentive for some conservationists to free-ride on other 
conservationists’ contributions, resulting in an under-provision of whale conservation in 
the market.  In the case where whalers must compensate conservationists to harvest (not 
the scenario modeled here), there is of course no i
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ride.14 Therefore, there are reasons to doubt the usual “neutrality” results in economics, 
which proposes that the initial allocation of rights in a market should not affect the 
equilibrium outcome (Fowlie and Perloff, 2013). The potential harm from free-riding is 
bounded under the management scenario envisioned in this paper due to the fact that 
harvest is constrained by the allowable catch limit. If the resulting market equilibrium 
harvest level—with no free-riding—is already greater than the maximum allowable 
harvest, then the imposition of the maximum allowable harvest will make the level of 
free-riding irrelevant under such circumstances. In other cases, if a “whaling buyout” 
occurs even with a significant degree of free-riding, then the level of free-riding is also 
not important to the result.  Furthermore, the possibility that large conservation or 
animal-rights NGOs may participate in a whale permit market may mitigate the severity 
of free-riding due to their ability to consolidate the contributions of their donors.  While 
incentives to free-ride between NGOs will persist, these incentives will likely be far less 
severe than in the individual donor case.  Also, the transaction costs of overcoming these 
free-riding incentives may be relatively low given the small number of large NGOs and 
their existing cooperation in other domains.   
The whaling choke price, unlike the parameters on CD, might actually be 
estimable, at least to a “ballpark” level, from market data to some reasonable extent, 
assuming profit maximization on the part of whalers.  Alternatively, the choke price and 
elasticity for whaling demand can be estimated from market data using econometric 
                                                 
14
 However, moral abhorrence (and potential shaming of individuals and NGOs) at the 
prospect of selling a whale permit to a whaler (and, thereby, “sentencing a whale to 
death”) could significantly elevate conservationists willingness to accept payment for this 
transaction relative to their willingness to pay to avoid the same outcome.   
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methods. While whale meat consumption is quite common in Norway, the elasticity of 
whale meat demand is probably in the ballpark of the elasticity of demand for beef 
arguably because beef is in the similar market and can serve as a close substitute for 
whale meat. This may provide a probable range for the whaling choke price, perhaps 
ranging between $9000 to $11,000 (Horan and Shortle, 1999)15. This indicates that for a 
particular level of free-riding, it may be possible to get a reasonable sense of just how 
likely the persistence of whaling is in a market. The degree of free-riding suggested in 
experimental research for the provision of public goods ranges from 40% to 60% – 
the percentage measuring the share of free-riding-of the optimal endowment level in a 
one-shot game, with the upper bound reflecting outcomes in a repeated public good game 
(Chaudhuri et al., 2006).  
In the context where the conservation side of the whale market is dominated by 
NGOs, it is possible that free-riding could be contained by the use of a third-party 
“charity rating” that reports to potential donors the numbers of whales “saved” by 
competing NGOs (Chhaochharia and Ghosh, 2008). A low “rating” on saving whales will 
likely turn potential donors to other NGOs who receive higher ratings. Such a rating 
system utilizes the stiff competition between NGOs for donors to reduce free-riding 
behavior. A brief browse on Sea Shepherd website demonstrates the stiff competition 
fund raising among NGOs: Sea Shepherd accused Greenpeace of fraud, and that 
Greenpeace has been raising millions of dollars from anti-whaling campaigns and yet 
betray whales. While we have primarily viewed the conservation market as operating 
                                                 
15
 Horan and Shortle (1999) calibrated the linear inverse whaling demand p=10991.04-
0.73075Q with elasticity equal to -1, and 1979-1983 whaling quantity and price data from 
Amundsen et al. (1995). Here the probable lower bound $9000 is adjusted by lower 
average price and whaling quantity. 
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through NGOS, private participation is possible as well, driven in part by philanthropists 
motivated in part by warm glow or through social approval through conspicuous display 
of documentation of their activities as a whale “life saver” (Andreoni, 1988, 1995).  On 
balance therefore, a 40-60% participation rate of conservationists seems entirely 
plausible. Combined with the probable range of the choke price for whaling demand, this 
participation level would most likely generate a pure conservation policy and least likely 
result in a pure harvesting policy under a nonlinear conservation demand.  
This study only focuses on long run steady state population and harvest level. The 
trajectory to the steady state, however, also deserves attention and may impact the 
stability and success of such a market. The whale permit market makes it possible to 
reallocate whale permits among stakeholders. Within the market system the whalers are 
entitled the initial whale permit due to the grandfathering allocation; conservation groups 
on the other hand have to buy into the market. The effectiveness of a whale permit 
market for conservation depends on the response of the fishery manager to changes in 
stocks.  If an increase in whale numbers prompts an increase in permits, as dictated by the 
PBR rule assumed in this paper, then conservationists may face increasing costs over 
time – driven in part by the success of their own conservation efforts in previous market 
periods!  For a whale species that is approaching carrying capacity, such as minke whale 
in Central North Atlantic, a quota setting will ensure that the initial permit quota for the 
first year will be maximal. As the market progresses year by year, the permit quota 
allocated to whalers will be less and less because minke whale population will decrease 
from the carrying capacity level to a relatively lower steady state level and 
conservationists will buy less in a high stock level. On the other hand, if whale species is 
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of low abundance, the permit quotas allocated to whalers will be increasing. The reason is 
that whale population will be increasing from low level to a relatively higher steady state 
level because in a low stock level conservation groups will buy and retire whaling permit.  
However, this suggests an increasing cost for conservationists. Under such a 
grandfathering rule if conservationists foresee this trajectory of increased costs, they have  
a “rent-seeking” incentive to oppose the market.16 Instead, they resort to alternative 
strategies by lobbying and disrupting whalers to get the same or even greater 
conservation with cheaper cost. By doing so, they are also able to claim a moral high 
ground for anti-whaling activities and potentially secure benefits from fundraising. The 
issues of the implied income distribution and resource allocation need to be addressed 
before the establishment of such a market.   
The correct shape of the CD curve is essential in evaluating the robustness of 
conservation success against free-riding, as indicated in Figure 3.4.  Despite being 
calibrated to the same dataset, the log-linear CD curve admits a pure-conservation, or 
“buyout,” outcome even with high levels of free-riding (i.e., only 20-30% participation 
level) over the range of whaling choke prices explored, whereas the linear CD curve does 
not do so even with the full participation level. A linear conservation demand curve 
indicates that marginal WTP decrease quite rapidly regardless population level. If 
conservation demand mostly is driven by the conservation concerns or animal welfare, 
then there is a “saturation effect” and the marginal WTP should decline fairly strongly at 
a low stock level but then decrease slowly as stocks rise to high levels. In that case, a 
                                                 
16
 One possibility to stave off this behavior would be to replace the strictly increasing 
PBR rule with one in which whaling quota is only allowed to increase to a maximum, 
“ceiling” level (perhaps tied to recent harvest levels).   
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nonlinear conservation demand is appropriate. One might also think that the conservation 
demand is driven by concerns for individual whales or the avoidance of suffering, in 
which case conservation demand may be very unresponsive to population levels across a 
wide array of population levels – causing a fairly flat conservation demand. The 
importance of the correct shape of the demand curves again highlights the importance of 
better data collection. 
Many concerns about whale permit markets are dominated by uncertainties—both 
biological and economic.  Using the limited data on minke whales, I focus on 
uncertainties associated with the whaling demand and conservation demand.  The study 
shows that the whale permit market mechanism is particularly sensitive to features of the 
conservation demand curve; unfortunately, the data needed to fully examine these 
uncertainties are not currently available.  This study illustrates a comparatively low-risk 
case where an experimental market for the adaptive management of a small-scale minke 
whale stock can help understand the ecological effect and risk of the management policy, 
and could yield substantial transferable insights. These, along with better data availability 
and comparison across different whale populations, can help shape subsequent policy and 
to assess market viability for systems on a larger scale. 
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Chapter 4 
A BIOECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SEA LICE 
EXTERNALITIES BETWEEN SALMON AQUACULTURE AND WILD FISHERIES 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Aquaculture is a rapidly growing industry that has become a major supplier of 
fish and shellfish to the global market (Naylor and Burke, 2005). According to the Food 
and Agriculture organization (FAO, 2011), aquaculture now accounts for 40.1% of global 
fish production. There are a number of issues that have constrained the development of 
aquaculture along the coast worldwide. For instance, shrimp and salmon, two of the most 
lucrative and widely traded aquaculture products, are subject to criticism for the 
environmental impacts of waste discharges, escapees, use of chemicals and drugs, 
consumption of fishmeal and fish oil, and disease and parasite spreading (Naylor and 
Burke, 2005; Morton et al. 2004; Morton and Routledge 2005; Krkošek et al. 2005 & 
2006; Asche et al., 1999). The economics of some of these issues have already been 
investigated. For instance, Sylvia and Anderson (1993) proposed a tax for aquaculture 
waste pollution. This study aims to evaluate the impact of disease transmission from 
aquaculture to wild fisheries, already recognized as one of the most serious threats to the 
sustainability of marine aquaculture and the viability of wild fisheries (Bulter, 2002; 
Naylor et al, 2000; Morton et al. 2003 and 2004; Krkošek et al. 2007). 
Marine fish farms may have a reservoir-host effect on disease transmission and 
pose a threat to adjacent wild stocks. Disease transmission from fish farms to wild 
fisheries represents a negative externality during the fish farming production process, the 
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value of which is the costs incurred by the affected adjacent wild capture fishers17. For 
fish farmers, this is an external cost. It is not considered in their decision process without 
the relevant policy being in place or through spatial consolidation implemented by 
credible regulators. Regulatory authorities currently use both trigger thresholds and farm-
fallowing after harvest to protect the wild fishery. These policy recommendations come 
from traditional disease ecology models (such as Anderson and May’s (1978) 
susceptible-infected model, Grenfell and Dobson, 1995; Krkošek et al. 2005 & 2006). 
While such epidemiological models are useful for understanding the system, they have 
limited utility in terms of providing management recommendations because they treat 
human behavior as external factor, and are not rooted in decision theory (Albers, et al., 
2010; Fenichel et al., 2010). Moreover, the causes of many disease problems, including 
pest, parasite and invasive species, are economic, and hence require economic solutions 
(Perrings et al., 2002).  As an alternative for providing management guidance, 
bioeconomic models incorporate information from epidemiological systems into an 
economic decision-making framework in which the level of disease control is 
endogenous (Horan et al., 2010).  
This study focuses on the management of sea lice externalities between salmon 
aquaculture and wild salmon fisheries. When wild stocks migrate to a fresh water 
environment in the fall for spawning, lice from wild stocks disperse into fish farms 
located on the migration route of wild stock and infest the farmed fish. If not treated in 
the farms, the lice will grow rapidly and re-infest wild juveniles when they emigrate into 
                                                 
17
 This study only focuses on the disease impact on wild fishery. However, disease may 
also influence the marine ecosystem, for instance by changing the biotic structure and 
distribution (Burge et al, 2014).  
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marine environment from May to July. The salmon louse (L. Salmonis) has a free living 
phase and a parasitic phase in its 6-8 week life cycle. Once the lice attach to a host 
salmon, they feed on mucous, blood, and skin which causes morbidity and mortality 
(Pike and Wadsworth, 2000; Costello 2006). Although the disease problem associated 
with fish farms is widely recognized18, there is very limited work to quantify the 
ecological and economic impact of the disease on both farmed and wild fisheries. It is 
reported that sea lice may cost the salmon industry US$480 million a year and 6 percent 
of product value (Costello, 2009). Liu, Sumaila and Volpe (2011) explore the ecological 
and economic impact under fixed exploitation policy and target escapement policy by 
exogenously and randomly set sea lice induced mortality rates. There is, however, no sea 
lice population dynamics in their framework.  
Prior bioeconomic studies have used an optimal control framework to study 
disease and pest control policy from both private and/or social perspectives (Gramig et 
al., 2009; Gramig and Horan, 2011; Epanchin-Niell and Wilen 2012; Sims and Finnoff 
2012; Horan et al., 2008; Fenichel et al., 2013; Richard et al., 2010). This study adds to 
the literature by investigating the externality between farmed fisheries and wild fisheries 
due to sea lice transmission. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first to integrate sea 
lice population dynamics with economic modeling to determine the optimal control 
policy from the perspective of salmon aquaculture, and then from the perspective of the 
joint fishery. By taking account of the complex relationship between sea lice populations, 
farmed fisheries and the wild fisheries, it is able to evaluate how much privately optimal 
                                                 
18
 Natural conditions produce a far lower infestation on wild juveniles than salmon farms 
(Morton, 2011). Krkošek et al. (2005) found that the maximum infection pressure (sea 
lice larval production per unit space) near farms was 73 times greater than ambient levels. 
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treatment behavior deviates from the socially optimal solution, and to assess the 
economic impact of salmon aquaculture on the wild fishery due to sea lice transmission.  
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section II describes the general structure 
of salmon aquaculture and the wild fishery. The various components of the bioeconomic 
model are provided in section III. The main results and the outcome of numerical 
simulations are presented in section IV. Finally, section V discusses the results and draws 
conclusions.  
 
4.2 The General Structure of Salmon Aquaculture and Wild Fishery 
 
The past several decades have witnessed the transformation of salmon aquaculture 
into a global industry. As shown in Figure 1, salmon farms are located along coasts that 
anadromous wild stocks swim through during their inward and outward migration. 
Salmon farms are typically stocked with several hundred thousand fish (Orr, 2007), and 
farms are highly concentrated in a small area. For instance, in the Broughton Archipelago 
of about 117 2km  in British Columbia, Canada, there are twenty-nine licensed salmon 
farms owned by three companies (Liu, et al, 2011). These farms are clustered near the 
river outlets. The farm sites are chosen initially for easy access to the market and suitable 
environmental conditions for raising fish. Elsewhere, salmon farming may be less 
concentrated than in the Broughton Archipelago area, but is more widespread.  There are, 
for example, approximately 850 licenses for fish farming in Norway (Färe et al., 2009). 
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Figure 4.1.  Major Salmon Aquaculture Production Regions around the World 
 
Note: Pic (1) is from Krkošek et al. (2007); pic (2) and (3) are from Krkošek et al. (2012). 
 
Anadromous species, such as salmon and trout, migrate between freshwater and 
seawater environment during their life cycles. The spawning stage takes place in 
freshwater environment, and the main growth stage takes place in the ocean. Depending 
on the species and location, most wild stock runs from a river are likely to mingle with 
the runs from other rivers within the 200 nautical mile zone of a country’s exclusive 
economic zone. In some cases, salmon runs from the rivers in one country will mingle 
with those from other countries in the open ocean (Ebbin, 2005). Most wild salmon 
fishing activity takes place during the spawning migration, and the fish are harvested 
offshore, inshore and then in the rivers.  
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Sea lice are native ectoparasite copepods, common on both farmed and wild adult 
salmon19, but unable to survive in a freshwater environment. Lice infection on Pink 
salmon and wild salmon is most reported and studied (Krkošek, et al., 2005, 2007; 
Morton et al., 2004; Marty et al., 2010) due to their vulnerability. When the wild stocks 
migrate back to the parent river for spawning, they carry adult gravid lice. These adult 
gravid lice reproduce and spread into any farms close-by, and re-infest the wild juvenile 
stocks when wild juvenile migrate into ocean environment. The presence of highly 
concentrated salmon farms around the coast may change the dynamics of sea lice and 
wild stocks. The impact of sea lice on wild stocks has been debated extensively. Some 
believe that sea lice are only one of many factors that affect wild stock levels (Brooks, et 
al, 2005; Brooks and Jones, 2008; Riddell et al., 2008; Marty et al., 2010); while others 
claim that where salmon net-pens provide ideal conditions for sea lice, they are a primary 
source of loss of vulnerable migrating wild juveniles (Krkošek, et al., 2005, 2007; 
Morton et al., 2004; Morton and Routledge, 2005; Frazer, 2008). 
Wild salmon fisheries differ from salmon aquaculture in terms of management 
objectives, institutional structure and regulations. The typical management objective for a 
wild salmon fishery manager is to conserve salmon populations and restore their habitat 
to avoid overexploitation. The management objective for salmon aquaculture, on the 
other hand, is to maintain and promote the profitability and competiveness of the 
aquaculture industry.  Wild fishery managers would typically impose restrictions on the 
                                                 
19
 Early stage sea lice are also found on sticklebacks, but no mature sea lice have been 
found on sticklebacks (Jones et al., 2006). Hence, sticklebacks may serve as a temporary 
reservoir for early stage sea lice. However, the epizootics on juvenile salmonids consist 
of the same early life-stages of sea lice, which are also found on sticklebacks. This 
suggests that both juvenile salmondis and sticklebacks are infested by the same sources 
rather than contributing to each other’s infestations (Costello, 2009). 
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limit (cap) on overall licensed numbers harvested in the wild capture fishery, along with 
input/gear restrictions, closed seasons and areas.  
 One commonly used management objective for wild fisheries is to ensure 
escapement spawning targets to ensure potential future harvest. Another is to set a fixed 
harvest rate in order to maintain the harvest level for fishermen.  Both aquaculture and 
wild fisheries can be managed by the same or by different authorities. In Norway, for 
instance, wild salmon stocks are managed by the Ministry of Environment, while salmon 
aquaculture is managed by the Directorate of Fisheries (Liu, et al, 2010). In Canada, 
salmon aquaculture has been traditionally regulated by the provincial Ministry of 
Agriculture and Lands, while the conservation of wild Pacific salmon is in the hands of 
the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). In 2009, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court transferred regulatory authority of salmon aquaculture from provincial 
authority to DFO, which indicates that DFO is responsible for managing both wild 
salmon and salmon aquaculture in British Columbia (Krkošek, 2010).  
 
4.3 Model Description 
4.3.1 Sea Lice Dynamics 
This study does not refer to any specific system; instead it is intended to abstract 
the core characteristics of the general system described in previous section. The 
simplified structure of the wild fishery and salmon aquaculture is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Consider a coastal area where an Atlantic salmon (Salmo. salar) farm (or a coordinated 
aquaculture industry consisting of many farms) is connected by the free-living stage of 
sea lice transmission with wild fish stocks when they migrate in and out. The farm 
manager releases salmon smolt
for spawning and harvests all fish 24 months after they are released
denotes farmed fish, and subscript 
salmon would typically remain i
 
Figure 4.2.  The structure of the Wild Pink Salmon Fishery and the Lice Dispersal 
between Wild Salmon Stock and Atlantic S
Note:  TAC: total allowable catch.  
dispersal takes place between wild fisher
                                                
20
 Fish farmers either use batch harvest of fixed interval to target specific market
grading harvesting operation during the whole out
on aquaculture production of fixed interval under batch harvesting operation. For grading 
harvesting operations, some farmers may release smolts at different time
supply the market all year around. This is also implied by the literature investigating the 
optimal harvesting time instead of setting T exogenously.
 
21
 See, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/FedAidpdfs/FRED.FishCultureManual.pdf
some papers model wild pink juvenile salmon swimming route
inshore area to the sea (Krkošek, 2006).
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 I lump sea lice production into a free-living copepodite phase and an adult lice 
phase. Sea lice cannot survive in a fresh water environment. Due to the relatively brief 
spawning migration (August and September) of wild pink salmon from the marine 
environment to fresh water environment, gravid lice from homecoming wild adult stocks 
would pass through coastal areas and infest farms by spreading the copepodite produced 
by gravid lice (
,w tL ). A higher sea lice infection rate in the abundant wild population will 
lead to a greater risk to salmon aquaculture. I assume that there is always a fixed 
proportion of total gravid lice (ς) remaining at the coast when the wild stock migrate 
upstream for spawning. These lice produce copepodites. Copepodites have some 
probability ρ of attaching to farmed (
,f tF ) or wild ( ,w tF ) hosts if present, and survive to 
adult lice stage with probability of tψ . The settlement success tψ  is subject to 
environmental factors, such as salinity and water temperature (Tucker, et al., 2000; 
Bricknell, et al., 2006; Groner et al., 2014). In this study, settlement success tψ  is 
assumed to be periodically forced, and takes the form, 
 
ψ
t
= ε1 + ε2 sin
2π
12
t




                                                                                               (4.1) 
This simple sinusoidal function assumes a 12 month periodicity and t=1, 2….12, and has 
a seasonal force impact coefficient 2ε and a base settlement success 1ε .  
The emigrating wild juveniles, when they pass through fish farms located close to 
wild migratory routes in May to July, are subjected to lice infestation from fish farms. 
These wild juvenile are at their most vulnerable because of their small size, and also 
subject to the environmental stress because they are transitioning from fresh water 
environment to marine environment. I further assume that when juvenile wild stocks 
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migrate into the ocean environment, a fixed proportion of non-attached copepodites from 
farms re-infest the juvenile wild stocks. I also assume that the chemical treatment tu , if 
applied, kills both adult sea lice and copepodites on farmed fish. The mortality associated 
with chemical treatment for copepodites and adult sea lice is denoted k and z, 
respectively.  
Consider a system where copepodites are well mixed instantaneously, and the 
copepodite density is the same across the coastal area. Since I focus on dispersal among 
farms and wild stocks, instead of the dynamics between infectious fish and susceptible 
fish, I also assume that sea lice within farms are well-mixed. Natural mortality for adult 
lice is denoted by v. Adult lice can produce copepodites at a rate of λ, which are also 
subject to natural mortality ξ, and attach to fish at rate ρ. Copepodite transmission 
between farmed and wild fish only happens during the spawning migration of wild adults 
and the emigration of juvenile wild stocks.  
Let tX  denotes total copepodite abundance in the coastal area at time t, then a 
discrete model22 for sea lice dynamics in farms is, 
( ) ( )
, 1 , , , , 1* 1 * f * /f t t t f t f t l t f t f tL X F L v u F Fρψ+ −= + −                                                   (4.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 , , , ,1 * 1 *ft F t w t t F t w t c tX L L X F F uλ ρ ρ ξ+ = + + − − −                                      (4.3) 
I assume that in this free-mixing system, the copepodites will not attach to wild 
spawning adults. This is because that the wild spawning adult will migrate upstream, 
where the sea lice cannot survive free water environment. However, when wild juvenile 
                                                 
22
 In these equations, ρ  is calibrated from Frazer et al. (2012) to make sure the term 
( )F, ,1 t w tF Fρ ρ− − is bounded between 0 and 1. I conduct the sensitivity analysis for this 
parameter in later section.  
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migrate into the ocean, they will be infested. Therefore, 
,w tF  in Eq (4.3) denotes the 
abundance of wild juveniles at the end of month t. 
,w tL  is total gravid lice from spawning 
wild stocks, and 
, ,w t w tL sF= . Here s represents the gravid lice number on each individual 
spawning wild fish, and is assumed to be maintained by processes occurring in the 
offshore ocean environment. This variable is exogenous and assumed to be constant 
(Frazer et al., 2012). 
Eq (4.2) gives the total lice number in farms at the beginning of each time unit 
(month) as the sum of the newly mature adult and the lice remaining from last period. 
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of Eq (4.2) is the number of copepodites 
attached to hosts that become adult. The second term on the RHS is the number of lice 
remaining from last period. There are four components of this term. The first is the total 
lice number at the beginning of last time unit, the second, (1-v), and the third, ( )l tf u , are 
the surviving proportions after natural mortality υ  and chemical treatment tu , 
respectively.  The surviving number of lice after the natural and chemical mortality
( ) ( ), ,* 1 * 1f t f tL v ku− − will lead to a loss of fish population from the initial , 1f tF −  to 
,f tF . Note here ,f tF  is the farmed fish population at the end of month t.  Therefore, the 
last term,
, , 1/f t f tF F − , denotes the effect of fish killed between time ( t-1) and t. I assume 
that if 10% of fish are killed, then 10% of total lice will also be killed, and hence if all 
fish are harvested, then all lice would be killed as well. 
Eq (4.3) models the dynamics of copepodites in the coastal area. The first term on 
the RHS is the number of copepodites produced by lice on farmed 
,f tL  and wild stocks
,w tL  . Note that ,w tL is equal to zero when there are no adult wild stocks in the inshore area.  
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The second term has two components, the first component is total copepodite abundance 
after dispersal, and the second component is the surviving proportion after natural 
mortality and chemical treatment ( )c tf u .  
The efficacy interval of chemical treatment varies depending on sea location, lice 
genetics, and water temperature (Saksida, et al., 2010; Stone et al., 1999). Here I assume 
that chemical treatment has a decreasing efficacy over a three-month period but that 
treatment from three months back still kills lice and copepodites, which is commonly 
documented (Gustafson et al., 2006; Stone et al., 1999).  The term that captures the effect 
of chemical treatment application for adult sea lice and copepodites, the kill function, is 
then modified as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2, , 1 * 1 0.8 * 1 0.6l t t t t t tf u u u ku ku ku− − − −= − − − and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2, , 1 * 1 0.8 * 1 0.6c t t t t t tf u u u zu zu zu− − − −= − − − , respectively.   
In this study I make the assumption that the fish killed by lice do not have any 
economic value, but that infested but still live fish fetch the same price as un-infested 
fish.  That is, the effect of sea lice is only evident through mortality, not other sub-lethal 
effects. Sea lice can, however, also reduce fish growth and feed conversion rates 
(Costello, 2006; Mustafa et al, 2001), although the literature provides little information 
on these affects. Therefore, in this study I fix the fish growth and feed conversion rates, 
and conduct sensitivity analysis for these two parameters. If the feedback of adult sea lice 
on weight accumulation is known, it could be easily incorporated in the model presented 
here. The impact of sea lice on the farmed salmon is modeled as 
( )f, 1 f, f, f,exp /t t f t tF F d L F+ = −                                                                                         (4.4) 
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where f,tF is Atlantic salmon abundance in farms at the end of time t (month), and f,0F is 
the total Atlantic smolts released at farms. The farm manager harvests all fish in two 
years (batch operation) once the juveniles are released in the farms.  When they harvest 
all fish, they also fallow the farms for a short time and all lice will be killed, and they 
manage to release the same amount of farm juvenile f,0F in the same month. fd is sea 
lice-induced mortality rate for farmed Atlantic salmon, and f,tL is adult sea lice 
abundance in farms at time t.  
Wild salmon juveniles (
,w tF ) are free of lice infestation in the river environment 
but are subject to re-infestation from fish farms when migrating into marine environment 
from May to July.  The number of lice in month t is the sum of new adults developed 
from copepodites and attaching to hosts, and the remaining lice from last period. Note the 
lice remaining at month t after natural mortality (1-v) will changes in the wild fish 
population level from 
, 1w tF −  to ,w tF . The lice ( , 1w tL +  ) dynamics in a freely-mixed system 
is modeled as,  
( ) ( )
, 1 , , , , 1* 1 * /w t w t t w t w t w tL F X L v F Fρψ+ −= + −                                                            (4.5) 
 I only model the lice dynamics inshore. Lice re-production dynamics also take place in 
the open ocean, and are subject to the processes occurring in offshore ocean 
environments, but are not modeled here. The effect of lice on wild fish stocks is 
incorporated into the constant natural mortality rate assumed to occur in the open ocean.  
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4.3.2 Wild Pink Salmon Population Dynamics 
Homecoming wild pink salmon are harvested offshore before migrating to their 
home river for spawning. Pink salmon are the smallest salmon found in North America. 
They have less commercial value than other salmon due to their low oil content. 
Commercially caught pink salmon are often canned and prepared for complete packaged 
meals. Pink salmon (O.gorbuscha) have a two-year life cycle, and have even and odd-
numbered year runs. These two runs are reproductively isolated.  Spawning wild adults of 
even-numbered year runs do not encounter and infest wild juveniles of odd-numbered 
year runs during their first early marine life stage (Krkošek, et al, 2006).  
Assume an initial escapement level, 0S , is known and is the same for odd and 
even-numbered year runs. Let nS denote the escapement level of wild stocks at year n. 
This escapement level becomes the spawning stock, which has a concave fry production 
function following a Ricker relationship ( )1, 1 exp /n n nF S S bγ+ = − , where 1, 1nF + is the 
number of fry in the next generation (n+1) of 1 month old, γ is the population growth 
rate, and b determines density dependent mortality and is related to the carrying capacity 
of the system. The breeding stock dies after spawning. A natural mortality rate m applies 
to juvenile wild salmon in fresh water, therefore the population of surviving wild 
juveniles before migrating into the inshore area is ( ) 1, 11 nm F +− .  
When wild pink juveniles migrate into and remain in the inshore area (May to 
July), they are subject to re-infestation from fish farms. For every farmed salmon grow-
out cycle, 24 months, there are 2 copepodite infestations from wild stocks (even and odd-
numbered) to farmed stocks, and 2 re-infestations from farm stocks to wild stocks. The 
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wild juvenile mortality rate induced by sea lice infestation23 is modeled using the Ricker 
equation (Krkošek et al., 2007; Marty et al., 2010), and a monthly time scale in 
accordance with time scale of the farmed fishery and lice dynamics. The damage function 
is estimated by Krkošek (2010), and takes the form ( )1, , ,*exp /t n t n w wt t nF F d L F+ = − , where 
,t nF  is juvenile numbers at age n at month t, and wd is the mortality rate induced by sea 
lice population wtL at month t  attached to wild juveniles ( ,t nF  ). Therefore, the wild 
juvenile population for each year right before migrating into the open ocean from inshore 
area would be 
( ) ( )
, ,
1 1, 1 , ,1 exp /
May June July
n n w w t t n
t
F m F d L F+ += − Π −                                                          (4.6) 
It is expected that sea lice-induced mortality among farmed Atlantic salmon, fd , 
is much smaller than wd . This is because when the farmed Atlantic salmon are released 
into the marine environment, they are on average 50 grams24, while wild pink salmon 
juveniles are only about 0.2 grams without scales (Brauner et al, 2012; Morton and 
Williams, 2003; Morton et al., 2004, 2005). The greater size of farmed fish relatively to 
wild juvenile fish enhances their resistance to infection. The stress born by wild juveniles 
migrating into the marine environment also makes them more vulnerable to disease. 
Before turning into two year old adults, wild juveniles in the marine environment 
experience a fixed natural mortality rateϕ . This rate includes the effect of many 
                                                 
23
 It is well-established in the literature that L.Salmonis in Pacific Ocean and Atlantic 
Ocean are genetically different, hence have differently pathogenic impact on fish host. 
24
 Juvenile Atlantic salmon can be stocked up to 75 gram before releasing to the net pen. 
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/aquaculture/lib-bib/nasapi-inpasa/BC-aquaculture-CB-
eng.htm. This might be a way to prevent farmed fish from getting out of net. 
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environmental factors along with sea lice, which are considered exogenous. Therefore, 
the wild adult abundance of each run at year n+1,
, 1w nF + , is,  
( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
, 1 1, 1 , ,1 * 1 * * exp /
May June July
w n n w w t t n
t
F m F d L Fϕ+ += − − Π −                                   (4.7) 
Note that twL ,
 
is the total lice infestation of wild juveniles migrating into the ocean 
environment from May to July each year. At other wild salmon stages, sea lice have no 
impact on wild salmon. Depending on the management objective, the harvesting policy 
varies. For instance, there are two harvesting policies in British Columbia, a fixed harvest 
rate and a target escapement (Liu et al, 2011). I assume that the regulatory authority can 
choose fishing effort level by license limitation, and each year a constant harvest 
proportion α is applied. Therefore, the total allowable catch ( 1nTAC + ) for each run is, 
( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
1 1, 1 , ,1 * 1 * * exp /
May June July
n n w w t t n
t
TAC a m F d L Fϕ+ += − − Π −                           (4.8)          
Eq (4.8) suggests that 1nTAC + , equal to , 1w nFα + , is subject to fluctuation due to sea lice 
infestation during the juvenile stage. The survival ( )
, 11 w nFα +− will then be the 
escapement level of wild spawning stock for the next generation.  
 
4.3.3 Economic Model 
Consider an aquaculture producer. For every 24-month grow-out season, he feeds 
farmed Atlantic salmon up to month 24 to weight fw  then harvests all fish at the last 
period instantaneously with harvest cost fc per unit of weight. The adult Atlantic salmon 
weighs about 7 kg, fetching a price of $6.5/kg, compared to 1.4k for an adult pink salmon 
fetching a price of $0.36/kg.  The farmer targets a specific market and sells the fish at a 
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fixed price fp  per kilogram. Once he harvests all fish, he will release the same amount of 
farmed juvenile stock in the farms25. Due to its close location to wild migratory routes 
and other adjacent fish farms, sea lice infestation could occur within the farm and from 
surrounding areas that cannot be controlled. Each period the producer has to decide 
whether or not to apply chemical treatment ( tu ) to his farms, the copepodite and adult sea 
lice kill function being ( )2 1,,c t t tf u u u− −  and ( )2 1, ,l t t tf u u u− − , as defined previously. I 
assume that fish farmers manage the fish farms optimally with respect to other inputs 
than chemical treatment effort, and this decision is separable from other productive 
inputs26.  
Farmed Atlantic salmon weight growth is modeled as a polynomial function of 
time 2 3
, 1 2f tw a t a t= − , where 24,...,11 =t
 
(Asche et al, 2012). In reality lice can affect this 
weight growth function, but here I assume that lice only affect salmon mortality. A 
farmed fish requires a certain feeding quantity for weight growth. The conversion ratio (
                                                 
25
 Here I assume that a batch operation will kill all lice. Also, I assume that a short-time 
fallow period, mandatory in many places such as British Columbia, will kill all lice and 
still allows manager to release the juvenile farmed salmon in the same month that they 
harvest the adult farmed fish. Therefore the grow-out rotation is not affected by the lice 
and assumed fixed here. Admittedly, this is simplified from the real world where fish 
farmers would release fish in spring and fall; also they rotate different farms for fallowing 
in order to supply the market all year around. The farmed smolts releasing time is not a 
decision variable arguably due to the low mortality rate from lice from the returning wild 
stocks.  
 
26
 Another important input decision is stocking density. However the literature suggests 
that salmon farm are typically stocked at a rate of about 10,000 for a medium- size cage 
(12m*12m*6m). Stocking rates also depend on water temperature and current flows and 
the size of the sea cage. A paper by Sylvia and Anderson (1993), for instance, assumes a 
constant 50 metric ton expected harvest per cage when they examine the effluent stock 
effect on fish production, and no rotation decision is involved. 
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conf ) is defined as the relationship between the quantity of feed and fish weight growth. 
The feeding quantity for each time step for a fish is thus ( )1( ) *con t tg t f w w −= − .  
 
4.3.3.1 Solving the Private Producer’s Problem 
I first solve the problem from the private producer’s perspective. Recall that I do 
not try to solve the problem for multiple farms; instead I assume that there is a single 
farm, or that the regulatory authority imposes a policy that coordinates management 
among all farms in the inshore area, meaning that the coordinated farms are operated as if 
there was only one owner.  Given the discount rate δ , feeding cost feedc  per kilo, and 
antibiotic cost of treatmentc , the problem for the aquaculture producer is to maximize the 
value of aquaculture production, net of control and feeding investment, pV , by choosing 
a treatment policy:  
( )
( )( )
24 140
,24
1
1960
,t 1 ,t , ,960
1
1V max p w
1
1
         w w ( )
1
t
j
p
f f f f n
u j
t
p
f f con feed f t t treatment f
t
c F
f c F u c S F
δ
δ
−
=
−
+
=
 = − + 
   − − + +  +   
∑
∑
              (4.9)                                                                                                  
subject to the state dynamics Eq (4.2-4.4) and the initial conditions 
,0fF  and 0S  . 
The control tu is a binary choice variable, [0,1]tu ∈ . Here I model it long enough 
(40 grow-out seasons, or 80 years) for the steady-state equilibrium to be reached. The 
time step is monthly, so I have a total of 960 months. For the weight difference term,
,2 ,1 , j*24 2 , j*24 1f f f fw w w w+ +− = − , where j=1,…40, denotes the fish farm out-growth 
season, the weight difference is determined exogenously, and lice have no impact on the 
weight accumulation. For a finite time horizon, a departure from steady state toward the 
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end of terminal time will be present (Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2011). To deal with this 
problem, I follow the logic of Epanchin-Neill and Wilen (2011), and I set a terminal 
value to lock the steady state equilibrium once it is reached in 40 rotations (year 80). This 
terminal value will then account for the benefit of the harvest and control cost accrued 
value after 80 years (40 rotations) — the last term in Eq (4.9), 
,40(F )fS . This terminal 
value is the present value of steady state farmed fish harvest net of control costs from 
time 81 year to infinitely. Since the system reach steady state at rotation year 40, 
therefore I am able to use the value at the 40th rotation year to calculate terminal value.  
Let 
,40( )p f f f fTVP P C W F= −  represent the profit from harvesting at the end of the 30th 
rotation, and ( )( )
960
, 1 , ,
936
J
f t f t con feed f t t treatmentTVC w w f c F u c+= − +∑  represents the cost of 
feed and treatment during the 30th rotation (from month 936 to month 960) under 
privately optimal control. The terminal value is then, 
( )
24 1
,40
41
1( )
1
j
p p p
f
j
S F TVP TVC
δ
−∞
=
 = − + 
∑  
 
4.3.3.2 Solving the Joint Fishery Manager’s Problem 
The joint fishery manager, on the other hand, has to consider the effect that the 
aquaculture production has on the commercial wild pink salmon fishery. Note in this case 
there is a fixed proportion of wild pink salmon to be harvested each season, determined 
exogenously. Therefore, the joint fishery manager’s problem considered here is a not a 
true social planner’s problem. To understand the joint fishery management problem, it is 
necessary to understand the objectives of the individual fisheries.  
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Wild fishery managers would typically impose restrictions on the license numbers 
for the wild capture fishery (along with other input restrictions). However, the efficiency 
of such regulations depends on substitution between restricted and unrestricted inputs as 
argued by Dupont (1991) and Deacon, Finnoff and Tschirhart (2010). Hence, these 
policies are often accompanied by other regulations such as allowable harvesting time 
and areas. Along with the minimum escapement policy imposed, wild fishery managers 
would ideally seek to prevent rent from being fully dissipated. I assume that with a 
homogeneous catchability and cost parameter, the wild capture fisher would choose an 
optimal fishing effort level E by license limitation. This will lead to the maximization of 
the net benefit of harvest at the level of the total allowable catch (TAC). The harvesting 
function for wild capture fishery for each wild fishery season is assumed to take the form 
( ), 1 nqEn w nh F e−= − , which represents the discrete-time version of the Schaefer-Gordon 
harvest function for a wild fishery at year n, where 
,w nF is total number of wild adult fish 
(number not biomass weight) at year n, q is the catchability coefficient and nE is the 
corresponding fishing effort at year n. Substituting n nh TAC= , and assuming that the unit 
cost per effort is wc , total annual cost (TC ) thus has the form
α−
=
−
=
1
1lnln
q
c
TACF
F
q
cTC ww . 
Assuming an adult pink salmon weight of ww  at harvest and price wp , the joint 
fishery problem is to maximize the net present value JV from fish farms and the wild 
fishery, net of control and harvesting cost over time, 
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 (4.10)                         
subject to the state dynamics, Eq (4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.8), and the initial conditions 
,0fF  and 
0S  . 
The last term of Eq (10),
,40 ,40(F ,F )J f wS , is the scrap value of the state variables 
after 40 rotations (80 years), ( ) ( )
24 1
,80 ,80
41
1
,
1
j
J J J J
f w
j
S F F TVP TVC TVW
δ
−∞
=
 = − + + 
∑ . 
Here I also let ( ) ,40J f f f fTVP P C W F= −  represent harvesting profit for the 40th rotation, 
and ( )( )
960
, 1 , ,
936
J
f t f t con feed f t t treatmentTVC w w f c F u c+= − +∑  represent feed and control costs 
during the 40th rotation under joint control (note that the time in TVC is month).  
( )79 80
2 1ln
1 1
J w
w w
cTVW TAC TAC w p
q α
= + −
− −
represents profit from harvest in the wild 
fishery in year 79 (odd-numbered year run) and 80 (even-numbered year run). These two 
years correspond to 40th rotation for fish farming operation.  
Here n denotes a yearly time scale as wild salmon are harvested every year. By 
taking into consideration the externality that farms create by the spatial migration of lice 
from farms to wild juveniles and the externality imposed by the migration of gravid lice 
from wild spawning stock to farms, the solution for the social planner’s problem will 
differ from the private producer’s problem. The aquaculture producer only controls lice 
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until the marginal value of the damage inflicted on the farms is equal to the marginal cost 
of applying chemical treatment to control lice in the farms, including future growth on 
the producer’s farms.  
 
4.4 Numerical Results 
Given the complex nature of this integer non-linear, non-convex optimal control 
problem, closed form solutions for the value function and optimal control policy do not 
exist. Furthermore, multiple locally optimal solutions may occur. Therefore, I rely upon 
numerical implementation to derive a solution for this problem.  Premium Solver 
Platform (multi-starting point) was used for the simulation and able to handle 1000 
variables and 1000 constraints (including integer constraints) with Premium Platform’s 
Branch and Bound method. I draw the economic and biological parameters of the models 
from the literature. I also make assumptions for missing information, then conduct 
sensitivity analysis over these parameters. All notation, parameters and abbreviations are 
described in Table 4.1 in the end of this chapter. The values for all parameters are 
provided in Table 4.2. Some of the parameters are taken directly from the literature, and 
some are calibrated for this study. Nonetheless, none are empirically derived and they do 
not reflect any particular system.   
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Table 4.2 Parameter Definition and Values Used for the numerical Simulation 
 
Note: "*" Mustafa et al. (2001) estimated sea lice control cost in East coast of Canada. 
The cost of chemical treatment per section was Can $150-2000/per cage raising 10000 
fish. Since I focus on a large farm (100 cages), I scale up the cost proportionally and 
conduct sensitivity analysis. "**" Liu et al. (2011) estimated that the equilibrium 
population level for pink salmon is about 760,000 in Broughton Archipelago BC. I scale 
up the wild population level to farmed salmon population level. "***": While there is 
uncertainty about these parameters, the multiplication of louse natality and settlement 
success should be much greater than louse mortality (Frazer et al., 2012). In their paper 
the settlement success is 0.22, and louse natality is 6.4 per day."****" Bricknell et al. 
(2006) estimated the effect of salinity on sea lice settlement success. The literature 
provides few empirical data on how seasonality impacts the lice settlement success. "ɫ" 
Frazer et al. (2012) used 0.90 as the chemical-induced sea lice mortality rate. Gustasfon 
et al. (2001) found that chemical has efficacy over 90 days. I make the assumption that 
the chemical-induced mortality rate is the same for lice and copepodite."ɫɫ" Asche et al 
(2012) used a value that is slightly higher in Norway."ɫɫɫ": Laukkanen (2011) used a 
higher unit cost per fishing effort for Baltic salmon.  I assume a high abundance level and 
hence a lower cost per fishing effort. The ones without any symbol in the reference 
column denote values retrieved directly from the literature. 
 
Parameter Value Note Reference
1000000 The fish numbered released at the beginning of each out-growth season Mustafa et al. (2001)*
1000000 The innitial escapement level for wild stock Liu et al. (2011)**
ρ 0.00000015 The propability that a copepodite attached to host Frazer et al. (2012)***
0.25 Base settlemet success for copepodite survival to adult stage on host Frazer et al. (2012)***
0.15 Seasonl force impact coefficient Bricknell et al. (2006)****
ν 0.15 Natural mortality for adult lice (one per unti of time) Frazer et al. (2012)***
k 0.85 Chemical treatment efficiency for sea lice Gustasfon et al. (2006)ɫ
z 0.85 Chemical treatment efficiency for copepodite Gustasfon et al. (2006)ɫ
λ 50 Natality (copepodite produced per adult female louse per unti of time) Frazer et al. (2012)***
ξ 0.5 Copepodite natural mortality Frazer et al. (2012)***
s 5 Fixed number of gravid lice on each individual wild spawning salmon Frazer et al. (2012)***
6.5 Market price for farmed fish ($/kg) Asche et al. (2011)ɫɫ
0.32 Market price for wild pink fish ($/kg) Liu et al. (2011)
δ 0.004074 Mothly discout rate Laukkanen (2001)ɫɫɫ
m 0.94 Natural mortality rate for wild juvenile in fresh environment Liu et al. (2011)
φ 0.5 Natural mortality rate for wild stock in marine enironment Liu et al. (2011)
ϒ 5.2 Wild population growth rate Liu et al. (2011)
b 4456618 Density dependent mortality Liu et al. (2011)
0.4 Mortality rate for wild juveile induce by sea lice Krkosek et al. (2007)
0.05 Mortality rate for farmed salmon induce by sea lice Krkosek et al. (2007)
1.5 Harvesting cost per kilo farmed fish Asche et al. (2011)ɫɫ
1 Feeding cost per kilo feeding Asche et al. (2011)ɫɫ
50000 Treatment cost per chemical application Mustafa et al. (2001)*
1.1 Food conversion ratio Asche et al. (2011)
30 Unit cost per fishing effort for wild fishery Laukkanen (2001)ɫɫɫ
q 0.016 Catchability coefficient for wild fishery Laukkanen (2001)ɫɫɫ
a 0.76 The harvesting proportion for wild fishery Liu et al. (2011)
1.43 Adult pink salmon weight (kg) Liu et al. (2011)
1ε
2ε
fp
wp
wd
fd
feedc
fc
treatmentc
conf
wc
ww
,0fF
0S
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The frequency and timing of chemical treatment determines the effect on the bio-
control of invasive species and disease alike. The binary control policies for private 
producer and the joint fishery manager in the first four fish farm grow-out seasons (the 
first 8 years) are clearly different, while the rest of period sees fewer differences. Both 
the privately and jointly optimal policy involves chemical treatment from August to 
November, and from June to December. Therefore, I am able to use the first four fish 
farm grow-out seasons to summarize and characterize the control policy differences 
between the private producer and the joint fisheries manager (Fig.4.3).  
 In the first year of the grow-out period, the private producer only applies 
chemical treatment from August to October, then from the next May to December. 
Specifically, the chemical treatment for the odd-numbered year run lasts from August to 
December, then from the next May to July. I refer to the treatment strategy starting 
August to December as the first period treatment strategy, which corresponds to the odd-
numbered year wild spawning stock migration back to natal river. I refer to the treatment 
strategy starting next May to July as the second period treatment strategy, which 
corresponds to the lice reproduction after the first period treatment for the odd-numbered 
year run. The treatment policy for even-numbered year runs is the same for all periods-
only applying chemicals from August to December. The distinction between the odd and 
even-numbered year runs is artificial. I assume that the odd-numbered years are first to be 
subjected to the lice infection. The time lag between odd and evened numbered year runs 
makes a difference due to discounting. This is confirmed through simulations that (a) set 
initial infection levels in odd-numbered year runs to zero, and (b) apply different discount 
factors. The second, third and fourth grow-out seasons see chemical treatment from 
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August to October then from the next June to July for odd-numbered year runs. Two 
factors may contribute to the delay in chemical applications in the second period 
treatment for these grow-out seasons. They are the effect of discounting and feedback 
from the control policy in the first year, which results in a lower spawning wild stock, 
and hence lower infection risk to farm and less chemical control.  
The joint fisheries problem, on the other hand, requires that chemical controls be 
applied from August to December, and then from June to July for odd-numbered year 
runs. The treatment policy under jointly optimal control for even-numbered year runs 
lasts from August to December—the same as that from privately optimal control. This is 
also due to the effect of discounting and the cheap price of wild stock. The second, third 
and fourth grow-out seasons have a chemical control policy applying from August to 
November, due to feedback from the control policy in the first year.  
In sum, the private producer applies less effort to control lice than the joint 
fisheries manager because they focus only on farm profits, while joint fisheries manager 
has to consider the wild fishery externality as well. In the first year of the first grow-out 
season, the private producer applies chemical controls earlier than a joint fishery manager 
would, from May to July versus June to July for jointly optimal control. Even though the 
private producer does not consider the wild fishery—wild juveniles emigrating inshore 
from May to July—the reduced control effort in the first period leads to earlier controls in 
later periods due to the lice reproduction in the farm. Symmetrically, the greater the 
control effort on the part of joint fisheries manager, and the three-month period of 
chemical efficacy, leads to later chemical treatment in second and subsequent grow out 
periods. Finally, feedback from the chemical treatment under jointly optimal control 
99 
 
leads to a more abundant spawning wild stock than that under privately optimal control, 
hence more lice will disperse into farms, leading to more control by the joint fisheries 
manager.  
Figure 4.3. Privately Optimal Control and Jointly Optimal Control Policy During the First 
Four Atlantic Salmon Grow-Out Periods 
 
 
Note: The letter in the axis denotes the first letter of the month. M: May, JN: June, and 
JL: July.  Private producer applies less effort for lice treatment than joint fisheries 
manager for the odd-numbered year run, but same control effort for even-numbered year 
run. Both private producer and joint fisheries manager apply more control effort in the 
early stage than in the later stage for each grow-out season. The effect of discounting and 
the feedback from control policy in the early stage/season also determine the control 
pattern in the later stage/season for both private producer and joint fisheries manager. 
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The treatment policy by the fish farmer deviates from that of the joint fishery 
manager only in the early years. This is understandable, since sea lice control in the early 
stages will have a greater impact on welfare than control in at later stages, partly due to 
the effect of discounting.  This difference in chemical treatment between the fish farmer 
and the joint fishery manager will result in different impacts on the wild population. 
Since the control of the fish farmer happens during the spawning stock migration period, 
it internalizes at least part of the external impact of lice control decisions. Furthermore, 
the binary nature of control also helps the alignment of fish farmer’s and joint fishery 
manager’s objectives.  
The consequences of the private producer’s control policy are illustrated in Fig 
4.4. The peak levels for copepodite and adult sea lice abundance are related to the time 
when wild spawning stocks migrate back to the natal river. The peak levels for 
copepodite and adult sea lice abundance corresponding to odd-year runs falls to a very 
low level then climbs back up, while the peak level for copepodite and adult sea lice 
abundance corresponding to even-year runs decreases until it levels off when the wild 
population approaches a steady state. These treatment policy differences for odd and even 
years generates an oscillating pattern of sea lice infestation. Note that one month less lice 
control in the first four grow-out periods for odd-numbered years in privately optimal 
control relative to joint control really drives down the odd numbered wild juvenile stock 
when they emigrate into inshore from freshwater environment.  Intuitively, all else equal, 
a reduction in wild spawning stocks implies less infection risk to farmed salmon stocks, 
and hence to wild juvenile stocks next year. Since wild juvenile salmon mortality falls, 
this increases the abundance of wild adults in the ocean, resulting in a high spawning  
Figure 4.4. Trajectories for C
Treatment), Wild Salmon Harvesting and 
Control 
Note: The privately optimal control pol
levels of steady state copepodite
spawning stock levels. There are two trends in a, b, c and d. The increasing trend 
corresponds to odd-year numbered
even-numbered year wild salmon run. 
 
stock, high infestation risk to farms, and high infection rates of wild juvenile stocks, and 
therefore fewer adults and a smaller wild spawning stock in the follow
oscillation pattern between the peak level of copepodite and adult sea lice abundance 
associated with odd and even
more obvious oscillation pattern for wild pink salmon harvesting and s
illustrated in Fig. 4.4 (c) and (d). 
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opepodites and Adult Sea Lice Abundance (Ex-
Spawning Stock under Private Optimum 
icy results in an oscillation pattern in 
, adult sea lice abundances, wild pink salmon harvest and 
 wild salmon run, and the declining one corresponds to 
 
ing year. 
-numbered year run also contributes to the presence of a 
pawning level
 
Ante 
 
the peak 
This 
s, 
The oscillating pattern is also present 
(Figure 4.5). The trajectory path, on the other hand, is 
and adult sea lice abundance levels corresponding to odd and even
both decrease smoothly. This lead
and spawning stock level, which is in stark contrast to 
associated with privately optimal control
 
Figure 4.5. Trajectories for C
Treatment), Wild Salmon Harvesting and 
Figure 4.5. Oscillation pattern
Two different levels of declining trend stand in starkly contrast to that from privately 
optimal control with the lower level corresponding to odd
run and higher level corresponds to even
 
Table 4.3 shows the net present value (NPV) and 
harvest and wild spawning stock level under socially and privately optimal control. The 
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difference between total NPV under the two control strategies is not significant 
(approximately 0.6% of total NPV under joint fisheries management). In other words, the 
externality generated by farms is quite small. This is because of the low price and small 
size of wild pink salmon ($0.36/kg and 1.43kg) relative to farmed Atlantic salmon 
($6.5/kg and 7.3kg). The steady state harvest and spawning stock level are approximately 
the same under both approaches. However the outcome is quite different for odd and 
even-numbered year runs, with less harvest and spawning stock levels in odd-numbered 
years due to differences in treatment policy.  
Table 4.3 A Comparison of Key Results between Private Producer and Joint Fisheries 
Manager 
 
 
4.5 Potential Institutions for Sea Lice Control 
Since analytical solutions for any market-based approach to control sea lice is not 
available due to the integer non-linear, non-convex optimal control problem, I also rely 
on numerical simulation to investigate a potential institution for sea lice control to align 
privately and jointly optimal control policy. I use Bellman’s principle of optimality, 
which allows me to induce farmers to adopt the jointly optimal control policy via a 
penalty for non-compliance with the jointly optimal policy, using a backward induction 
method.  The amount of penalty for not compliance is determined as followed, 
Private Producer Joint Fisheries Manager
Total Net Present Vlue 266,865,337 268,501,973
Net Present Value for Aquaculture 261,431,513 260,469,439
Net Present Value for Wild Fishery 5,446,824 8,032,534
Wild Fishery Harvesting at Steady State (Odd Year) 632,100 632,100
Wild Spawning Stock at Steady State (Odd Year) 199,610 199,610
Wild Fishery Harvesting at Steady State (Even Year) 721,550 721,550
Wild Spawning Stock at Steady State (Even Year) 227,858 227,858
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• Solve for the private optimum in the last rotation (T=40) when the wild stock 
level inherited at the beginning of this rotation is exactly the same as the 
beginning of T rotation along the jointly optimal trajectory.  
• If treatment in period T differs from the jointly optimum, increase the penalty in 
the month that deviates from the jointly optimum until the privately optimal 
control “flips” to match the jointly optimal control. In months when the privately 
optimal control does not differ from jointly optimal control, a zero penalty is 
assumed.  
• Move back to T-1 rotation. The wild stock level inherited at the beginning of T-1 
rotation is set equal to that along the jointly optimal trajectory. Solve for the 
privately optimal control in rotation T-1 and T, with the penalty found for rotation 
T still in place.  
• If the lice control pattern at either rotation T or T-1 differ from those along jointly 
optimal control, adjust the penalty in rotation T-1 only until the lice control in 
both rotation align jointly optimal control.  
 
The simulation is run twice for each rotation. The first run corrects a control 
deviation in November. After a penalty imposed in November, a second run corrects for a 
control deviation in October, and requires a penalty in October. Where simulation in the 
first rotation finds control deviations in two months (November and December), the 
penalties in these two months and increased simultaneously until the control “flips”. This 
leads to an increasing penalty for non-compliance from the first to the second rotation. 
Figure 4.6 showed the penalty regime for non-compliance for private producer over all 40 
105 
 
rotations.  I found that the penalty for non-compliance begins from 37th rotation and 
increases when moving backward. Penalties occur mostly in October and November, 
except for the first rotation where they occur in November and December, or only in 
November (36th and 37th rotations).  
Figure 4.6. The Penalty Regime for Non-Compliance for Private Producer over 40 
Rotations 
 
The decreasing value of the penalty is due to a combination of discounting and the 
decreasing value of the externality resulting from declining wild stock levels and hence 
declining wild harvests. The aggregate value of penalties needed to induce compliance is 
approximately $5.2 million, more than three times the value of the externality. While this 
discrepancy is large, the reason arguably lies in the binary nature of the lice control. Little 
information exists on the magnitude of tax, subsidy or penalty to internalize the 
externality under the context of binary control.  Intuition suggests that the total amount of 
these instruments required can be greater or smaller than the economic benefit loss 
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resulting from the negative externality. The reason lies in the gap between the penalty 
threshold of “flipping” and the true benefit loss due to the externality. 
 
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis of key parameters was carried out relative to the maximized 
net present value (NPV). In principle, all parameters could be evaluated by how the result 
changes in response to change in each parameter in the model. I focus on a subset of 
parameters and approach the sensitivity analysis in two steps. First I consider an 
economic parameter, the price of wild salmon, wp , and then I consider other key 
biological parameters and another economic parameter, treatment cost.  
The price of wild pink salmon is particular important as the price may vary due to 
market integration. Asche et al. (2005) found that farmed and wild salmon are close 
substitutes on the Japanese salmon market, and that the increasing supply of the farmed 
salmon would lead to a price decrease in all salmon species.  However, in North America 
there might be niche markets for wild salmon due to preferences for wild caught fish or to 
market labelling laws that requires the source of fish to be identified. Such product 
differentiation has also been promoted by many wild salmon conservation coalitions and 
environmental associations. Eco-labelling can change consumer’s behavior (Teisl, et al, 
2002), and consumers may be willing to pay a premium for this environmental friendly 
product. Therefore, there might be a price drift and fishermen might be able to sell wild 
salmon in North America at a higher price.  
Since the producer’s behavior will not be affected by wild salmon price changes 
under privately optimal control, I examined the control policy and its biological 
consequences under socially optimal control 
($0.36/kg), medium ($0.6/kg) and high
pink salmon ($0.36/kg) and chub salmon ($0.94/kg) in North America. 
indicates, when the wild salmon price increases, 
in farms more frequently in order to reap more benefit from the wild fishery. So there is a 
‘stair pattern’ between the total number of monthly treatment
price.  
Figure 4.7.  Total Monthly Sea 
Salmon Price Is Low ($0.36.kg), 
Figure 4.7 also illustrate
There is an initially smooth decrease, then an oscillati
planning horizon the oscillation is quite close to the
doubled, the oscillation pattern is still present, 
significantly smaller. However, a further increas
a higher level of harvest and spawning stock level
361 months out of the possible 720 months. 
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over a range of salmon prices, low (base) 
 ($0.72/kg). Lice infection is most common in 
 As figure 
a social planner would apply chemical
s and the wild pink salm
Lice Control Level and Harvesting Level When the 
Medium ($0.6/kg) and High ($0.72/kg) 
s the consequences for wild pink salmon harvesting. 
ng pattern. By the end of the 
 wild salmon price. When the price is 
but the amplitude of the oscillation is 
e in wild salmon prices will not result in 
s, and the control policy will increase to 
 
4.7 
s 
on 
Pink 
 
108 
 
I also conducted sensitivity analysis for a subset of biological parameters and for 
treatment costs. These biological parameters are chosen because of their high degree of 
uncertainty. These uncertainties highlight the center of current debate on the effect of lice 
on wild salmon. To conduct sensitivity analysis for attachment and settlement success, 
louse and copepodite mortality, chemical efficiency, natality, mortality rate for wild 
juvenile induced by sea lice, mortality rate for farmed salmon induced by lice, food to 
body weight conversion ratio and treatment cost, I increased these parameter values 
individually by 10%, and examined the percentage change of the resulting total 
maximized NPV, while keeping others at the base value.   
Table 4.4 reports the results of sensitivity analysis for these parameters. It shows 
that the impact of each key parameter is consistent between the private and social 
problems except for sea lice-induced mortality rate for wild juveniles.  Under privately 
optimal control, all else equal, a 10% increase of sea lice-induced mortality will lower the 
wild juvenile population, hence less wild spawning adult and less infestation for farm 
fish. Under socially optimal control, the gain for aquaculture producers is less than the 
cost to the wild fishery. The total NPV under these two control scenarios are most 
sensitive to chemical efficiency k on lice and conversion ratio f. A 10% increase in 
chemical efficacy will result in approximately 2.2% and 2.1% increase in maximized 
NPV for privately optimal control and socially optimal control, respectively. On the other 
hand, a 10% increase in conversion ratio will result in approximately the same, 3%, for 
both privately optimal control and socially optimal control. This result is consistent with 
the literature. For instance, Costello (2009) found that one of the most significant costs of 
sea lice management is the reduced feed conversion efficiency. A 10% increase in control 
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cost has negative but relatively weak impact on the net present value of the fishery. While 
increasing the value of this parameter also changes the value of steady state population 
for odd-number year runs but not for even-numbered year runs. I include this information 
in the last column in Table 4.4.  It shows that a 10% increase in chemical efficiency 
results in a 11.5% of population increase, while a 10% increase in lice natality and 
copepodite settlement success to adult stage both lead to a 10% decrease in steady state 
odd-numbered year run stock levels. This also suggests that the greatest divergence in the 
trajectory between privately optimal control and jointly optimal control comes from these 
three parameters. A 10% increase in chemical efficiency under privately optimal control 
results in a significant reduction of chemical controls, decreasing applications from 437 
to 360 over 80 years.    
Table 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
  
Note: Table entries represent the percentage of change in maximized net present value, in 
response to a 10% increase in parameter value relative to its value in Table 2, while 
holding all other parameter values constant.  
 
 
 
 
Parameter Privately Optimal Control Jointly Optimal Control
Steady State Odd-Number 
Year Run under Privately 
Optimal Control
ρ -0.4423 -0.3293 -0.9551
ν 0.1195 0.0642 1.7520
k 2.2252 2.0923 11.497 (270 controls )
z 0.1457 0.0542 2.9000
λ -0.445 -0.3323 -9.9210
ξ 0.0598 0.0138 1.2078
d w 0.0245 -0.0003 -1.1432
d f -0.1886 -0.2541 0.0757
Ψ -0.4539 -0.3323 -9.9209
-2.9947 -2.9796 0.0010
-0.2705 -0.2102 0.0010
conf
treatmentC
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4.7 Discussion 
Salmon aquaculture is one of the fastest growing industries worldwide. Salmon 
farming production surpassed wild caught salmon in 1996, and has now become an 
economic driver for many regional economics. Despite its potential, local governments 
are reluctant to introduce salmon farming due to its environmental effects. At the top of 
the list of environmental effects is disease transmission between salmon farms and wild 
fisheries, which concerns fishermen and environmental groups tremendously.  It is 
important to manage this issue based on both biological and economic factors. To the 
author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to integrate sea lice population 
dynamics, fish population dynamics and economic model, and to provide a tool to 
investigate the sea lice management policy. Also, it investigates an institutional 
arrangement for addressing the externality issues generated by the salmon aquaculture 
that prevents the whole system from being efficient.  
Several assumptions were made when constructing the bioeconomic model. The 
first is that copepodites and adult lice both have a one-month life cycle. This is based on 
the lumping of free-living stages and stages during which copepodites attach to fish hosts. 
In reality, the timing of different stage varies with temperature, and the copepodite’s life 
span could be longer in lower temperatures. Changes in environmental factors are found 
not only in the impact on louse survival and growth, but also on the adult lice’s natality 
rate. Secondly, lice are assumed not to evolve and develop any resistant strains in 
response to chemical treatment. The assumption here is that lice are either killed or not 
infected by the chemical treatment, and lice surviving the chemical treatment still have 
the same growth and natality rates. Increasingly, evidence suggests the emergence of 
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resistance to chemical uses (Murray, 2011). The development of resistant lice would 
come at a cost—it takes time for the surviving and exposed lice to develop the same 
growth and natality rate as lice in the absence of chemical treatment. Finally, it is 
assumed that wild juveniles with a non-lethal infestation level may still maintain the 
same growth rate. Evidence suggests that parasite infestation would influence wild stock 
dynamics, that the physical impact is additive, and that the exposed wild stock during 
infestations would suffer significantly lower growth rates, leading to a smaller spawning 
sizes (Krkošek, et al., 2007; Skilbrei and Wennevik, 2006).  
The analysis shows how sea lice management strategy changes in response to two 
different property right regimes. While the state trajectory paths are different, both 
regimes reach the same steady state harvesting and spawning stock levels with the same 
oscillation pattern. While this study only deals with a single private aquaculturist, or a 
coordinated aquaculture industry, the numerical results suggest that a coordinated 
aquaculture industry would result in decline of wild pink salmon population regardless of 
the management regime. This result is consistent with the conclusion reported in many 
sea lice studies. However, the economic benefit to joint fishery management is not 
significantly different from that to separate fishery management. There are two possible 
reasons for this. The first is that the nature of binary control helps the alignment of 
private and joint fishery objectives. Private producers, to some extent, already internalize 
part of the externality when they make their own treatment decisions. Secondly, the low 
price and weight of adult wild pink salmon, relative to that of Atlantic salmon, means that 
the damage they sustain is relatively low value. This study also shows that a penalty for 
non-compliance, derived using backward induction logic from Bellman’s principle of 
112 
 
optimality, is able to replicate the control behavior of jointly optimal control strategy.  
The relatively large magnitude of the total penalty compared to the externality cost is 
arguably due to the binary nature of sea lice control.  
This study is based on modeling assumptions for the sake of mathematical 
tractability, evaluation and calibration of parameters because of the vast uncertainty 
associated with these parameters. Some of these inputs and models are used directly from 
the literature, others have been modified to fit the numerical setting in which the study is 
performed. While it is desirable to simplify the related models in order to focus on the 
core questions framed in the objective outlined above, it should be noticed that the 
problem inherently is very complicated. This simplified model only measures the net 
effect of sea lice loaded on fish, and cannot identify various underlying causal 
mechanisms. To the extent that this simplified model and parameters used in this study 
different significantly from the real world, the estimated results may be biased and the 
extrapolation of the results should be taken cautiously. I believe that the model built here 
is sufficiently rich and captures the essential epidemiology and economic necessary to 
understand the problem at hand, and provides insight for the regulation of sea lice 
transmission between farmed fish and wild fish population.  
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Table 4.1 Variables, Parameters and Abbreviations in the Theoretical Model
 
                  
Symbol Definition
t Month
Total lice abundance in wild population in time t
ς Proportion of total gravid lice dispersed into farms 
ρ The propability that a copepodite attached to host
The fish numbered released at the beginning of each out-growth season
Total farmed fish abundance
Total wild fish abundance
Settlementment success for copepodite survival to adult stage on host
Base settlemet success for copepodite survival to adult stage on host
Seasonal force impact coefficient 
Chemical treatment binary variable
k Chemical treatment efficiency for sea lice
z Chemical treatment efficiency for copepodite
v Natural mortality for adult lice (one per unti of time)
λ Natality ( Copepodite produced per adult female louse per unti of time)
ξ Natural mortality for copepodite ( one per unit of time)
Total copepodite abundance in the coastal area at time t
s Fixed number of gravid lice on each individual wild spawning salmon
Sea lice-induced mortality rate for farmed Atlantic salmon
Escapement level of wild stock in year n
The innitial escapement level for wild stock
The wild fry abundance of age (n+1) at  month t
The population growth rate for wild stock
Density dependent mortality 
m Natural mortality rate for wild junevile in fresh water environment
The wild jevenile mortality rate induced by sea lice
Natural mortality rate for wild stock in marine evironment
The wild adult abundance of  at year n+1
α The harvesting proportion for wild fishery
Total allowable catch for wild stock at year n+1
The weight of adult farmed fish (kg) 
Harvesting cost per kilo farmed fish
Market price for farmed fish
The weight of farmed fish at month t
Food conversion ratio 
Feeding quantity at time t for farmed fish
Monthly discout rate
Feeding cost per kilo feeding
Chemical treatment cost per section
j Fish farm out-growth season
Harvest level for wild fishery at year n, same as TAC
Catchability coefficient for wild fishery
Fishing effort at year n for wild fishery
Unit cost per fishing effort for wild fishery
Adult pink salmon weight (kg)
Market price for wild fish
,w tL
,f tF
,w tF
tψ
1ε
2ε
tu
tX
f,0F
fd
nS
0S
t, 1nR +γ
b
wdϕ
1nTAC +
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has presented three substantive papers to investigate the effect of 
size-based prices on fishery management and harvest, the effect of market uncertainty in 
the ecological consequence of an establishment of whale permit markets, and the problem 
of disease externalities between farmed salmon stocks and wild salmon stocks, 
respectively. Each paper has introduced a new model, contributes to the bioeconomic 
literature, and has management implications with regard to the traditional fishery science, 
whale conservation policy and sea lice control policy. 
 
Traditionally, fishery science tackles the growth overfishing problem with yield-
per-recruit (YPR) and revenue-per-recruit (RPR) models.  These models are 
conventionally used to determine fish harvesting rates where there is a trade-off between 
the size of the fish and the number of fish available for harvesting. One goal of the first 
paper has been to compare and contrast three strategic approaches for managing the 
growth over-fishing problem when there is a price premium for larger size of shrimp: 
conventional YPR without consideration of economic trade-offs, RPR when there is size-
based price information, and harvest strategy based on a bioeconomic model with the 
size-based price effect. The chapter adds to the current literature by extending the 
framework traditionally used to deal with growth overfishing in fishery science. The 
numerical results suggest that there are potential economic advantages to the inclusion of  
size-based price information. An interesting feature is that strategy based on revenue-per-
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recruit that considers the sized-based price effect can generate a rent that is close to that 
from bioeconomic strategy when there is low natural mortality, but not when there is high 
natural mortality.  
 
The second paper aims to quantify the effect of economic uncertainty on the 
conservation potential of a whale permit market that allows environmental organizations 
to buy and retire permits, and to forecast the possible steady state ecological outcome. 
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the conditions in which 
transactions in a whale permit market will lead only to whaling, to complete 
conservation, and to the coexistence between waling and conservation. One of the biggest 
concerns about a global whale permit market versus the current moratorium policy is the 
free-riding issue due to the public good nature of whale conservation and the 
implementation challenges. The possibility of opening up a regional whale permit 
market, such as in Norway, is considered. The objective of this paper is not to estimate 
the resulting social welfare for whaling and conservation groups, instead it places 
emphasis on the long run harvesting and conservation status by considering key 
economic uncertainties. The simulation results suggest the possibility of three types of 
outcome: harvesting all permits, whaling buyout and the coexistence of whaling and 
whale conservation, depending on key parameter distribution. However, under probable 
parameter ranges, the pure conservation policy is the most likely outcome.  
 
The third paper develops a unique bioeconomic model to analyze the disease 
transmission problem between farmed fisheries and wild fisheries. It investigates the 
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incentive for the management of sea lice from the perspective of private aquaculture 
producer and then a joint fisheries manager. This allows me to evaluate how much 
privately optimal treatment behavior deviates from the jointly optimal control solution, 
and to assess the economic impact of salmon aquaculture on the wild fishery due to sea 
lice transmission. An institutional arrangement is considered to correct the externality 
that fish farms create. A feature of this problem is the discreteness of sea lice 
transmission between wild fishery and aquaculture farms and the binary nature of sea lice 
control. My results suggests that private aquaculture does have an incentive, to some 
extent, to treat lice during the wild salmon migration period, and that the binary nature of 
sea lice control can partially help private producers to internalize the sea lice externality 
to wild fisheries. The numerical results also indicate different state trajectories under two 
different management regimes, privately optimal control and jointly optimal control. 
Another finding is that the externality that fish farms generate is relatively insignificant 
compared to the total net present value of the farmed fisheries.  
 
Concerns about the sustainable exploitation and development of marine resources 
are likely to persist and intensify with the presence of poorly defined property right 
regimes over many common property marine resources. Indeed, with the demand for 
marine resources increased, the problem that is associated with sustainable resource 
allocation is more imperative. Bioeconomic models are developed to investigate the inter-
temporal decision with the presence of negative externality, and to evaluate the economic 
and ecological tradeoff.  
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The bioeconomic model developed in the first study can be generalized and 
applied to other annual species or species that do not show a significant relationship 
between the breeding stock and juvenile recruitment into the fishery. The second study 
examines the steady state equilibrium harvest and population level, the trajectory to the 
steady state, however, is also important. The conservation effort would also benefit the 
whaling groups by increasing whale population level and hence more whaling permits 
grandfathered to whaling group. How to address the implied increasing cost for whale 
conservation for market design, and possibly the increasing free-riding as well because of this 
increasing cost pattern? The second and third study both make assumptions due to the limited 
data information and highly uncertainty associated with parameters. The implied results can 
be refined by further studies, for instance, through a contingent valuation for whale 
conservation, and through field study on how temperature changes the dynamic of sea lice. 
The sea lice study also assumes a coordinated farm industry. In reality, this also raises 
question: how to design institutional systems that effectively control sea lice dispersal 
among different farms and wild fishery? Or are these institutional systems worthy? These 
questions provide directions for future research.  
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                                                       APPENDIX A 
                      YIELD AND REVENUE-PER-RECRUIT ANALYSIS  
                              WITH BOUNDED FISHING MORTALITY 
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Impulse harvesting is generally infeasible. If capacity and therefore fishing mortality (f) 
is bounded above, the maximized yield-per-recruit involves solving for the opening ( ct ). 
The biomass yield for a particular recruit is then (Getz and Haight, 1989), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
max
,
c
t
c
t
Y f t fw t x t dt= ∫   
Here f is fishing mortality, it is a constant throughout the season, tx  is the number of 
individual alive, tw  is the weight of each individual, ct is the fishing open season, and 
maxt is the maximized age of cohort. Note that in the numerical example, the shrimp is 
recorded in discrete categories (week), therefore a discrete version of yield is used.   
 
In the case of constrained fishing mortality f, the maximized revenue-per-recruit similarly 
involves solving fishing opening season Rt . The revenue from catch is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
max
,
R
t
R
t
R f t f t x t dtψ= ∫  
where Rt is the fishing open season, and maxt is the maximized age of the cohort, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )t p w t w tψ =  .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
